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Artworks as Business Entities: Sculpting
Property Rights by Private Agreement
Christopher G. Bradley*
Modern business entities, such as LLCs, are increasingly created and deployed to
accomplish customized transactions and evade legal restrictions. Rather than acting as
traditional business enterprises, entities serve as tools to facilitate complex commercial
transactions and surmount limitations presented by existing bodies of law. One limitation
constrains the ways that private parties can agree to divide property rights-a doctrinal
limitation sometimes referred to as numerus clausus. This Article shows that such limitations
on the customizing ofproperty rights by privateagreement now can be surmounted by virtue
of modern business entity law. After describingthe key features of modern business entities,
this Article provides a preliminary assessmentoftheir logic and limits.
Modern business lawpermits an assetor set ofassets to be placed into separatebusiness
entities with carefully tailored structural and governance features. It allows parties to
customize theirproperty rights in the asset(s) however they wish, with surprisinglyfew limits.
Entities can be formed andmaintainedcheaply with virtually no meaningfulpublic disclosure
required Participantsin the operation of the entity need undertake very few duties toward
each other or the entity itself The advent offlexible, powerful, and cheap entities under this
body of business law renders limitations on the division of property rights increasingly
obsolete. Large, complicated businesses already use webs of entities to divide rights in their
assets and subsidiariesfor financial, operational, and other reasons (such as regulatory
arbitrage). Costs and convenience are now so low as to open the door to smaller scale
participantsin commerce.
As a concrete example of these developments, this Article focuses on the "Artist's
Contract, " a 1971 project in which artists sought to retain rights in artworks they sold-to
obtain apercentageoffuture appreciationin value, to exhibit works upon request, andso on.
As noted in priorscholarship, the transactioncontemplated by the Artist's Contractcould not
have been accomplished in regular contract form due to numerus clausus and related
limitations. But this no longer remains true. This Article describes an "Art LLC" solution to
the "problem" of the Artist's Contract. By structuring the sale of art as the sale of a
membership interest in a carefully crafted businessentity that actuallyholds title to the art, the
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*
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goals of the Artist's Contractcan be achievedat relatively little expense or inconvenience. In
other words, modern business entity law provides convenient, reliable tools to "solve" the
legalproblems of the Artist's Contract, and to allowfor the bespoke, dividedproperty rights
sought by the originatorsof the Contract.
This Article then assesses the proposed Art LLC solution and the broader trend it
exemplifies in business law. This Article surveys the various bodies of law that limit the
effectiveness of this type oflegal maneuver and that protect againstits abuse, and it identifies
some advantages of novel, business entity-based solutions over more traditionalapproaches
to the division of property rights. This Article concludes by discussing the need forfurther
research into the logic and limits of evolving uses of business entities for transactional
purposes.
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INTRODUCTION

The last few decades have seen a startling growth in the variety of
business entities as well as in their number. Hundreds of thousands of
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new entities are formed each year in the United States-over 200,000
in Delaware alone in 2018.' Some of these are small businesses started
by entrepreneurs pursuing the American Dream. Some are subsidiaries
formed by existing companies to spin off part of their existing business
or embark on a new venture. But many of these business entities in fact
do no business. Many are formed for other purposes, such as holding
an asset, obscuring the identity of the real party behind a transaction, or
serving as a way station for money as it is moved from one place to
another.
The mandatory requirements and standardized business forms of
the past have been supplanted by highly flexible arrangements.
Customized entities have been used to attract financing by allocating
business risks in a more finely calibrated way, to facilitate novel
acquisition and management arrangements, to avoid taxes, and for
myriad other purposes. Commonly, entities are created merely to
facilitate a transaction that would otherwise be impermissible due to
barriers presented by contract, property, bankruptcy, copyright, and
other bodies of law.
Aggressive use of legal entities is hardly novel. No small part of
the success of John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil derived from its
aggressive and "creative" business planning practices.2 The innovative
use of trusts for financing, for asset preservation, and for other reasons
dates back centuries before Rockefeller.' But business law has become
much more lenient and flexible in recent decades, costs of organization
and operation have declined, and technology has eased the
administration of business entities. As a result, business entities are ever
more pervasively and ingeniously deployed.
One problem that commercial parties sometimes face is the legal
restriction on their ability to divide property rights by private
agreement, a doctrinal limitation sometimes referred to as numerus
clausus. This Article considers how modem business entities can be
used to surmount this limitation and divide property rights, as they
want, by private agreement and at minimal expense. Business law now
permits an asset or set of assets to be placed into a separate business
entity with carefully tailored structural and governance features. It
allows parties to customize their property rights in the asset(s) however
1.

Annual Report Statistics, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/ (last

visited Dec. 5, 2019).
2.
3.

See infra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
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they wish, with surprisingly few limits. Modem business entities can
be formed and maintained cheaply and with virtually no meaningful
public disclosure; they can be governed pursuant to tailored private
agreement; and participants in the operation of the entity need
undertake very few duties toward each other or the entity itself. The
advent of flexible, powerful, and cheap entities under modem business
law renders limitations on the division of property rights increasingly
obsolete.
Webs of entities are used already by large, complicated businesses
to divide rights in their assets and subsidiaries, for financial,
operational, and other reasons (such as regulatory arbitrage). Costs and
convenience are now so low as to open the door to smaller scale
participants in commerce. What could have been done only with
considerable expense and uncertainty can now be accomplished with
much less expense and more reliability. The tools of business entity law
are now available on a wider scale to serve the goals of a wider range
of actors.
To furnish a concrete example of these developments, this Article
focuses on the "Artist's Contract," a product of early 1970s art-world
idealism. The Artist's Contract was intended to be a vehicle for artists
to retain rights in their art after its sale. The so-called "resale royalty
right" is the most prominent provision; it would have entitled artists to
obtain 15% of the appreciation in value of any work sold under the
Artist's Contract.' The contract also included so-called "moral rights"
such as the right to veto a potential exhibition and the right to
consultation before attempting repairs on the art.
Existing law, however, renders such a contract unenforceable
under many common circumstances. Property law is generally hostile
to encumbrances on personal property such as those enshrined in the
Artist's Contract. Also, the requirement of privity will likely prevent
the contract from being enforceable against any new owner of the art
who has not actually agreed to its terms. Finally, copyright law's first
sale doctrine restricts the ability of artists to prevent collectors from

4.

SETH

SIEGELAUB &

ROBERT PROJANSKY, THE ARTIST'S RESERVED RIGHTS

TRANSFER AND SALE AGREEMENT art. 2(b) (1971) [hereinafter ARTIST'S CONTRACT], http:!!
www.primaryinformation.org/files/english.pdf The pages are not consecutively numbered
through both sections of the document. References to the introductory material will be by page
number (Artists Contractat [page]) and references to the contract will be to the article number
(Artist's Contractart. [number]).
5.
ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 4, at 2; id arts. 7, 10.
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exhibiting or reselling art.' These are all significant doctrinal problems
with the Artist's Contract as conceived and initially drafted.
But all is not lost. There is a solution to the problem presented by
the Artist's Contract. Part H lays out a simple but powerful approach to
the problem. The approach entails replacing the Artist's Contract with
another, much more potent contract-a limited liability company
(LLC) operating agreement.
The LLC is the paradigmatic modem business entity.' In the
1990s, due to a confluence of liberalizing Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) taxation policies, increasingly flexible state business laws, and
computer technology that eases recordkeeping and administrative
burdens, the LLC rose to a dominant position among business entities.'
In 2018, 157,142 LLCs were formed under Delaware law alone, more
than 72% of the total number of entities formed in Delaware that year. 9
Among other remarkable features, Delaware permits the members of
its LLCs to dispense with traditional duties aside from the minimal
"implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 0 It
permits LLCs to be formed with no public disclosure of their purposes
or the assets or parties involved, and with low fees (for Delaware, a few
hundred dollars total; some states are much lower)." Entities then can
operate throughout the United States with little restriction. 2
The Artist's Contract furnishes a case study of the power and
flexibility of business entities. By using an LLC, an artist can evade
6.

17 U.S.C.

§ 109 (2018) (codifying the first sale doctrine); see Brian L. Frye,

EquitableResale Royalties, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 237,247 (2017) [hereinafter Frye, Equitable

Resale Royalties].
SHAWN J. BAYERN, CLOSELY HELD ORGANIZATIONS 243 (2014) [hereinafter
7.
BAYERN, CLOSELY HELD ORGANIZATIONS] ("[U]nder modern law the answer to the question

'Which entity should our new business use?' is almost always an LLC."); id. (noting choice of
other entities tends to be motivated merely by "convention").
8.

LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 119-36 (2010) (describing

origins and factors that led to ascendance of LLCs and similar associative forms); Susan Pace
Hamill, The Story ofthe Limited Liability Company: Combining the Best Featuresofa Flawed
Business Tax Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 295 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds.,

2005).
9.
Annual Report Statistics, supranote 1.
The duty requires little beyond obedience to whatever contractual duties the
10.
members have agreed upon. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2019).
11. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
12. States can add requirements of registration and notice that impede some of the
freedoms given to business entities, but generally internal firm matters (such as duties among
members) are for the state of origination only. See generally Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., 500
U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (declining to displace State law that allocates governing powers within the
corporation); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987) (discussing the
State's role in creating and regulating corporations and defining their rights).
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doctrinal restrictions and accomplish the goals of the Artist's Contract.
The artist simply places the artwork into an "Art LLC." Then instead
of selling the object to the collector-buyer, she sells an ownership
interest (or "membership interest" in LLC parlance) in that entity. She
retains a membership interest of her own, with whatever limited rights
she wishes to preserve-such as the right to receive resale royalties or
to veto exhibitions. Because the Art LLC-not the collector-legally
owns the art, the artist's protections should survive the hurdles that
beset the original Artist's Contract.
Parts III and IV assess the Art LLC as a normative matter and as
an example of an important, broader theme-the use of business
entities to sculpt property rights by private agreement.
Part m explores the logic and limits of the Art LLC under current
law. First, it argues that the Art LLC is more reasonable an arrangement
than it might initially seem. It is a way of giving legal form to an
ongoing relationship between artist, collector, and art. Contrary to the
conventional image of art sales as discrete, one-off transactions, the
parties' interests are often intertwined beyond the time of sale. Artwork
remains connected to the reputation and other work of the artist who
created it and the subsequent activities of both buyer and seller can
affect the value of the art that is sold as well as of the artist's other
works. From this perspective, it begins to look sensible (if novel) to
allow parties to art transactions to structure their future relations by
means of a business entity. The traditional "moral rights" that artists
maintain in their handiwork, even after it is sold, actually respond to
the same concerns as the Art LLC. The Art LLC approach might
provide not only more rights as a substantive matter but also more
ability to customize the relevant package of rights, honoring chosen
arrangements over legislative fiat.
Second, this Part identifies important limits in current law that
protect against abuses of this legal tool. It discusses the ramifications
of various other bodies of law on the Art LLC arrangement-including
agency, securities, and bankruptcy law. It emphasizes that while the Art
LLC is novel in that it uses business entities to sculpt rights in
individual items, sculpting property rights by private agreement is
already commonplace among sophisticated legal actors such as large
corporate groups, where corporate "webs" carve out creditors' rights
and claims to various assets and subsidiaries. Modem business law is
now becoming democratized to an extent not yet recognized by
scholars and policymakers. The Art LLC example usefully illustrates
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potential new uses (and abuses) of the business entity form abound and
shows they deserve renewed attention.
Part IV discusses how some of the benefits of the business entity
approach could be obtained by other existing legal tools-including
trusts, leases, bailments, and security interests. Alternatively, it notes
that lawmakers could protect agreements to divide property rights
(such as the original Artist's Contract), by ordering that reservations of
rights clearly noted on works of art would be legally binding, or by
creating a central registry where potential buyers could investigate
claims on particular artworks. The comparison of the business entity
scheme with these other legal approaches illustrates the virtues and
vices of using business entities as transactional tools. It places business
entities alongside numerous legal tools that can be made to serve
similar functions. Part IV identifies some advantages of novel business
entity-based solutions over more traditional alternatives for division of
personal property rights, and it stresses some of the significant risks this
new trend brings.
Part V concludes by calling for energetic scrutiny of both the
benefits and dangers of the proliferation of business entities as
transactional tools.
II.

THE ARTIST'S CONTRACT PROBLEM-AND A BUSINESS ENTITY
SOLUTION

A.

The Contract

The Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement,
known as the "Artist's Contract," was the brainchild of an impresario,
gallerist, and dealer named Seth Siegelaub, who worked with a lawyer,
Bob Projansky, to draft and promulgate the agreement in 197 1. " The
Artist's Contract was a customizable form contract for artists to use
when selling their work. The poster on which the contract was

13.

See ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 4. The authoritative book on the Artist's

Contract is MARIA EICHHORN, THE ARTIST'S CONTRACT (Gerti Fietzek ed., 2009). See also

Christopher G. Bradley & Brian L. Frye, Art in the Age of ContractualNegotiation, 107 KY.
L.J. 547 (2018) (providing an analysis of the Artist's Contract and its social, market, and legal
context); Lauren van Haaften-Schick, Conceptualizing Artists' Rights: Circulations of the
Siegelaub-ProjanskyAgreement Through Art and Law, OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (2018)

(providing a nuanced and deeply considered discussion of the themes, purposes, and context
of the Artist's Contract). On Siegelaub and his milieu, see ALEXANDER ALBERRO, CONCEPTUAL
ART AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLICITY (2003).
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originally printed exhorted artists to "POST, REPRODUCE and USE"
it.1 4 It has been reprinted often.II
Under the contract, the collector agrees not only to pay the initial
purchase price, but also, if the collector sells the art, to pay the artist
15% of any profits on the sale.1 6 The collector can sell only if the new
buyer agrees to abide by the contract and the collector files a small
"transfer" form included in the agreement with the artist, so that the
artist can keep track of the work and its ownership." The collector
agrees to notify the artist of any proposed exhibitions during the artist's
lifetime and to comply with any of the artist's "advice or requests"
regarding an exhibition, including the artist's decision to withhold the
work from an exhibition altogether." The collector agrees that the
"Collector will not intentionally destroy, damage, alter, modify or
change the Work in any way whatsoever."' 9
The artist agrees to convey the artwork to the collector, maintain
a. record of the work, and provide certification of authenticity if
requested.20 The artist retains the right to reproduce the art.21 During the
artist's life, the artist may obtain and exhibit the work for up to sixty
days over any five-year period.22 Aside from copyright licensing, the
artist's rights cannot be assigned.2 3
The contract instructs the artist to cut out the notice portion and
attach it to the art, or if it cannot readily be attached due to the nature
of the art, to attach it to the documentation or certification used to
represent that work in passing ownership.2 4 The contract states that
future transferees of the art will be bound by the terms of the

14.
ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 4, at 4.
15.
See id. at 2; van Haaften-Schick, supranote 13, at 14, 55 n.108.
16.
ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 4, arts. 1, 2. Here and throughout this Article, I
use the term "collector" as is common in the art world, and as the Artist's Contract does, to
describe what we might otherwise describe as the "buyer" of art. Id at 2.
17.
Id art. 2.
18.
ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 4, arts. 7, 16. In his introduction, Siegelaub
identifies this as a provision many collectors will not accept. Id at 2.
19.
Id art. 9. Should the work need repairs during the artist's lifetime, the collector
agrees to consult the artist to make "any required repairs or restoration." Id. arts. 10, 16.

20.

Id arts. 1, 6.

21.
Id. art. 12. However, the artist agrees that she "shall not unreasonably refuse
permission to reproduce the Work in catalogues and the like incidental to public exhibition."

Id
22.
23.

Id arts. 8, 16.
Id. art. 13.

24.

Id art. 14.
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agreement.25 Most of the agreement remains in force for twenty-one
years after the later of the death of the artist or the artist's spouse.2 6
Context is crucial to understanding the Artist's Contract. The late
sixties and early seventies were of course a time of great social,
cultural, and political turmoil in the United States, and this turmoil riled
the art world even as the art market grew rapidly. In an infamous 1969
incident, after the Museum of Modem Art in New York City refused to
display an artwork per one artist's specifications, he entered the
museum, grabbed his work, and walked out with it.2 7 This defiant act
catalyzed the organization of an activist group called the Art Worker's
Coalition, with which Siegelaub became involved.28 The Artist's
Contract can be seen as an outgrowth of this movement, 2 9 as part of an
effort to organize and leverage artists' power in the public square and
in the marketplace.3 0 Artists wanted to maintain control over their artand to capture more of the gains of rapidly rising art values.
Siegelaub was a significant player in the "Conceptual Art" scene,
although he departed it soon after promulgating the Artist's Contract.3
Enthralled by a rising group of boundary-pushing artists, he
experimented with innovative promotional methods, using
unconventional means to publicize the work of his unconventional
friends and associates.32 Consistent with this, the Artist's Contract
served not just as a useful template but also as a bold and innovative
statement. The artist Maria Eichhorn suggested that the contract serves
25. Id. art. 15.
26. Id. art. 16. For exceptions, see supra notes 18, 19, 22 and accompanying text.
27. See van Haaften-Schick, supranote 13, at 10, 52 n.84.
28. Id.
29.
See EICHHORN, supra note 13, at 262.
30. ALBERRO, supra note 13, at 164 ("[T]he Agreement was a political project that
provided the groundwork for substantive artist empowerment.").
ALBERRO, supra note 13, at 3-5. He apparently left for Paris, where he later
31.
developed keen interests in "Marxist media theory and the history of handwoven textiles."
Bradley & Frye, supra note 13, at 587.
32. An example of the "conceptual art" Siegelaub promoted: "[Ian Wilson's] work
involved oral communication. People would pay for him to talk. I remember we sold works by
Robert Barry which consisted of inert gas released into the atmosphere in Los Angeles . . , ."
EICHHORN, supra note 13, at 50. One of Siegelaub's shows was titled January 1-31 1969: 0
Objects, 0 Painters, 0 Sculptors, 4 Artists ... 32 Works, I Exhibition, 2000 Catalogues.
RICHARD J. WILLIAMS, AFTER MODERN SCULPTURE: ART IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

1965-70, at 83 (2000). Among the non-"object" artistic works that were exhibited were radio
waves generated by a hidden transmitter and the radiation from a small amount of barium-133.
Id Consistent with the art he promoted, Siegelaub's "gallery shows" and "catalogues"
undermined traditional notions. For instance, he would organize shows in non-gallery spaces
such as abandoned office buildings or produce catalogues memorializing exhibitions that never
actually occurred.
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as "an expression of the 1960s critique of social conditions applied to
the example of art and the art trade."33 Another artist, Jenny Holzer,
who has been involved in artists' rights advocacy, goes even further: "I
think it is very good as a practical document, and I also believe it is
good Conceptual art."3 4 The practicality for artists in their actual
dealings was vital to the project, but enforceability was not the only
consideration.3 5 In its social context, the contract was one of a number
of means by which artists sought individual and collective
empowerment.3 6 Conceptual artists often sold their art to like-minded
friends and collectors sympathetic to the activist goals of the project,
who were willing to accept forward-looking forms of conveyance for
avant-garde artworks.3 7 The contract was one of numerous attempts to
delimit and maintain the boundaries of this community-while also, of
course, profiting from the broader market expansion.
From the perspective of the artists, the U.S. art market was
thriving but was leaving artists behind. In many other countries, artists
enjoy a panoply of what are referred to as moral rights (droit moral) in
their artwork, as well as resale royalty rights (droit de suite).3 8 These
rights are largely lacking in the United States. Resale royalty rights
entitle the artist to a percentage cut of a later sale of the art (either of
the profits on such sale or of the gross sales revenue). Notably, the state
of California, the artist-friendly country of France, and numerous other
countries have included such provisions in their laws.39 Moral rights

33.

EICHHORN, supra note 13, at 15. To her, the contract encourages a critique of the

facts "that art is practiced in a field determined by social, economic, and political forces, by
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, and that art is entangled in manifold ways in the
mechanisms of the market and of political representation." Id at 11.
34.
Id at 119, 125 (interview with Jenny Holzer).
35.
Id. at 261-77 (noting that Siegelaub insisted on the intended practical purposes of
the contract and describing the process used to reach the initial published form).
36.
The various related efforts are recounted in Bradley & Frye, supra note 13.
37.
EICHHORN, supra note 13, at 261-77.
38.
van Haaften-Schick, supra note 13, at 61 n.162.
39.
1 LEONARD D. DUBOFF ET AL., ART LAW DESKBOOK: ARTISTS' RIGHTS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MORAL RIGHTS, AND FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 4-69 to 4-76 (3d ed.

2016) (discussing general principles of resale royalty rights); id. at 4-76 to 4-80 (Califomia
Resale Royalty Statute); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Royalties for Artists Versus
RoyaltiesforAuthors and Composers, 25 J. CULTURAL EcoN. 259, 259-61 (2001) [hereinafter
Hansmann & Santilli, Royalties] (summarizing laws); Guy A. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite?
InalienableProfit-SharingSchemes in CopyrightLaw, 27 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 49, 65-66 (2013)
[hereinafter Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite?]. The California statute has been held
unenforceable on preemption grounds. Close v. Sotheby's, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir.

2018).
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protect certain rights in the artist's work even after a sale. Although they
vary greatly in application, these rights include:
[T]he right of integrity, under which the artist can prevent alterations in
his work; the right of attributionorpaternity, under which the artist can
insist that his work be distributed or displayed only if his name is
connected with it; the right of disclosure, under which the artist can
refuse to expose his work to the public before he feels it is satisfactory;
and the right of retraction or withdrawal, under which the artist can
withdraw his work even after it has left his hands.4 0
Many countries protect such rights,4 1 but the protection of moral rights
remains relatively weak in the United States.42
Moral rights and resale royalty rights can be seen as ways to
recognize, legally, that the fates of artists and their art remain
intertwined beyond the time of original sale. The display of a defaced
work of art could damage an artist's reputation; moral rights prevent
this. An artist might work hard to enhance her reputation, thus raising
the value of a previously sold work of art with no effort from the
43
collector; the resale royalty right compensates for this. The Artist's
Contract emerged from a context in which artists considered
themselves to be getting an unfair shake due to inadequate recognition
40.

Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A

ComparativeLegal andEconomic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 95-96 (1997) [hereinafter
Hansmann & Santilli, Authors'andArtists'].
See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6
41.

bis, Sept. 9, 1886, S. Treaty Doc. 99-27, 99th Cong., 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (not adopted by the
United States until 1989), Bradley & Frye supranote 13, at 553; Hansmann & Santilli, Authors'
and Artists', supra note 40, at 96-97, 141-42 (discussing reasons for the U.S. government's
actions).
See, e.g., Rub, Strongerthan Kryptonite, supra note 39, at 57 n.22 (discussing the
42.
United States' reluctance to adopt laws protecting moral rights).
Resale royalty rights became a flash point in the red-hot art market of the 1960s
43.
and 1970s. Some successful artists felt aggrieved when their art appreciated greatly, giving
what they perceived to be a windfall to their collectors. One (in)famous example: Robert
Rauschenberg was incensed when, among other things, a collector sold an object-a painting
entitled Thaw, which Rauschenberg had sold to him for $900 in 1958-at auction in 1973 for
$85,000. See Frye, Equitable Resale Royalties, supra note 6, at 237, 239 n.2 (describing and
providing various sources for the details of the alleged interaction). Rauschenberg fiercely, but
ultimately unsuccessfully, advocated that federal policymakers provide a droit de suite to
American artists. See Amy Whitaker, Artist as Owner Not Guarantor: The Art Marketfrom the
Artist's Point of View, 34 VISUAL RES. 48, 52-53 (2018) [hereinafter Whitaker, Artist as
Owner].
While the economics of the artists' argument are not convincing, Professor Frye and I
have argued elsewhere that the advocacy for resale royalty rights can be understood as part of
a broader attempt to catalyze a social movement empowering artists in an increasingly
impersonal marketplace that they felt alienated them from the values they were seeking to
espouse and nurture in their art. See Bradley & Frye, supra note 13.
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of these post-sale connections. The "art workers" sought to rearrange
the norms of the art market in which they participated and legal reform
was one of their tools. They pursued statutory reforms, as in the
California law, and explored novel private arrangements, as in the
Artist's Contract.
Scholars and policymakers have studied moral rights and resale
royalty rights extensively. Moral rights, such as the rights of integrity
and attribution, have generally fared better with commentators and
analysts." Many moral rights preserve the value of assets from
arbitrary damage and bring benefits to the art market by allowing artists
to build and maintain a reputation based on their endeavors over time;
particularly when artists have the power to waive them if they so
choose, such rules are at least defensible.
Resale royalty rights are another matter. Mandatory (i.e.,
nonwaivable) resale royalty rights have been sharply criticized. First,
they are difficult to administer consistently and easy to evade.4 5 Second,
they bring perverse distributive effects. Mandatory resale royalty rights
lower prices for all art that is sold by the cost of the retained upside
value of the resale royalty right.4 6 But most works of art never increase
in value; the art market is highly risky and stratified. The royalty will
only pay out for artists whose work later increases in value. 47 These
very artists are usually able to produce new works to sell at now-higher
prices, thus reaping plenty of benefits from their enhanced status on the

44.
See, e.g., Hansmann & Santilli, Authors' and Artists', supra note 40, at 142
("[S]ervitudes [such as those imposed by some moral rights] can potentially serve a useful role
in the field of fine arts, particularly in controlling reputational externalities."). But see Amy M.
Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REv. 263, 265 (2009) (providing an argument that
seeks "to undermine the foundations of moral rights scholarship, law, and theory").
45.
John Henry Merryman, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 40 J. COPYRIGHT

Soc'y U.S.A. 241, 253-54 (1992) (discussing evidence for claim that resale royalty rights are
too difficult to administer). Due to the portability of art and the lack of transparency in art
transactions, such laws are difficult to enforce and encourage regulatory arbitrage (i.e.,
structuring transactions so as to evade the scope of such laws or jurisdiction of the courts
enforcing the laws).
46.
Concededly, "[i]n practice, the risk discount on the primary art market is so large
that a resale royalty right would probably have little effect on prices. Only a tiny fraction of
works retain any value on the secondary market." Bradley & Frye, supra note 13, at 558. Still,
one expects an effect at the margin, and the distributive effect, overall, hardly seems desirable.
47.
See, e.g., Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing CaseforResale Royalties, 124 YALEL.J.
F. 1, 2 (2014) [hereinafter Rub, Unconvincing Case] ("[T]here is no convincing justification to
enact resale royalty rights and to force society to incur their significant costs."); id. at 2 n.6, 3
n.8 (collecting prior literature).
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market.4 8 To put it bluntly, resale royalty payments look like a windfall
for them at the direct expense of their less-successful peers.49 Resale
royalty rights resemble lottery tickets that every artist is forced to "buy"
at each sale of their art, with little likelihood of "winning.""o
Consensually agreed-upon resale royalty rights are less troubling.
Although the overall societal effect of honoring such agreements is
questionable, 5 ' and although there are legal and practical barriers to
enforceability, the voluntary nature of such transactions renders them
less concerning.52
This Article takes its cue from the notion, shared by the
promulgators of the Artist's Contract, that some artists would like to
agree with some collectors to retain some rights, similar to existing
moral and resale royalty rights. Assuming that to be the case, can such
a transaction be structured to succeed, at reasonable costs, and with
likelihood of success?

Merryman states that this was true even for Robert Rauschenberg, whose
48.
complaints about the lack of a royalty sparked discussion of the issue in the United States in
the early 1970s. See Merryman, supra note 45, at 249.
See id. at 254 ("Knowledgeable artists oppose the right because they believe that it
49.
works to their disadvantage."). For discussion of the risk preferences and tolerances of earlycareer artists, late-career artists, and collectors, in a related context, see Rub, Stronger than
Kryptonite?, supranote 39, at 98-101.
50.
For this reason, there have been numerous proposals over time to collect resale
royalties and distribute them in some way to the broader artist community. See, e.g., Frye,
Equitable Resale Royalties, supra note 6, at 266-67 (discussing this issue and using, among
other things, a lottery metaphor); John Henry Merryman, Comment, The Wrath of Robert
Rauschenberg, 41 AM. J. COmp. L. 103, 122 (1993) ("[I]f there were to be a charge on art resale
transactions it might better be collected and administered for the benefit of needy artists.
Instead of an artists' droit de suite there would be a charge on resale transactions paid into an
artists' welfare fund.").
Whitaker, Artist as Owner, supra note 43, at 54-55, articulates some of the
51.
arguments for and against the artists' position in the course of proposing her own novel
approach to this issue. For a full-throated articulation of the skeptical view, see Rub, Stronger
than Kryptonite?, supranote 39, at 78-95, 107-08, 132-33 (summarizing existing analyses and
presenting models in support of the conclusion that droit de suite and related policies are on
balance welfare-decreasing for both society and artists). Professor Rub argues that, if anything,
restrictingthe ability to contract for resale royalties would help artists more: "[A]s explained
above, if creators are overly optimistic, then from a policy perspective, society needs to be
concerned with artists' decisions to make too much of their financial return contingent on
commercial success." Id. at 110.
The distributive effects are still problematic and somewhat undermine the idea that
52.
the Artist's Contract was a blow in favor of otherwise-starving artists. Voluntary terms are more
easily agreed to by those who already have the market power to convince collectors to agree
to such terms, or the prosperity to accept the lower price that collectors will pay for receiving
lesser rights in the art they purchase. If markets are depressed overall due to the use of contract
terms by some artists, all artists will be affected.
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I argue the answer is yes-though the original Artist's Contract is
not the right tool. This Article develops a way to make provisions such
as those in the Artist's Contract binding and enforceable not just against
the initial buyer of art but also later collector-purchasers of an artwork.
This proposed approach to the Artist's Contract problem serves as an
illustration-a proof of concept-of how business entities can be
deployed to sculpt property rights by private agreement.
In the subpart below, I explain the problems with the Artist's
Contract itself, which boil down to the fact that it attempts to divide
property rights in ways that our law doesn't recognize. Then I turn to
my solution, which involves the creation of a business entity to house
the art and share rights in it between the artist and the collector as they
please.
B.

The Problem

There are serious reasons to doubt the enforceability of the
original Artist's Contract.5 3 As this subpart shows, it fails the
requirement of contractual "privity," it introduces an unenforceable
form of servitude on chattels, and it runs afoul of copyright law's first
sale doctrine.54 These defects render the contract unenforceable as to
"downstream" collectors of the art (i.e., purchasers who acquire the art
after the initial transaction) in many common circumstances.
1.

Contractual Privity and Servitudes on Chattels

Much of the Artist's Contract would be enforceable as a binding
contract between the artist and the initial collector. For instance, the
collector could owe a resale royalty payment to the artist at the
contractual rate, 15% of the profit received in any future sale.
But what if the initial collector breaches the contract and, without
informing the artist of the sale and paying the royalty, sells to a new
collector who is unaware of the contract? The new collector might then

53.
See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, 1 LAW, ETHICS AND
THE VIsuAL ARTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 4-141 to 4-143 (1st ed. 1979) (summarizing the
difficulties with enforceability of the artist's contract).
54.
To be clear, as acknowledged above, these problems are with the strict, legal
enforceability of the contract. It is of course the case that parties might nonetheless comply
with the contract, whether out of fear of litigation or out of a sense of the moral rightness of
compliance.
55.
See ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 4, arts. 2(b), 4 (granting artist entitlement to
15% of "Appreciated Value" reflected in any "Future Transfers").
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sell to another collector, who might sell to yet another collector-all of
whom might lack awareness of the initial contract.5 6
Of course, the artist would have a right to bring a claim for
damages against the initial collector." But in many instances, a claim
against the original collector alone would be cold comfort. By the time
the artist found out about such a breach, it might be too late to collect
any damages. For example, the initial collector might have died,
become judgment proof, or moved to a jurisdiction where the claim
would be prohibitively difficult to pursue.

There might not even be a remedy against the new buyer even if he were aware of
56.
the contract. One applicable remedy might be for "Intentional Interference with Performance
of Contract." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

766 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). This remedy

would be uncertain at best, however, not to mention expensive to litigate. See id. cmts. h, j, n
(providing discussion and examples that support application of this tort to the fact situation
discussed here would be uncertain at best).
To help the artist do so, the contract could be modified to provide for "liquidated
57.
damages" for breaches of the various provisions. This would relieve the artist of the otherwise
difficult task of proving damages as a result, for instance, of having a work shown without their
permission. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The
Numerus Clausus Problem andthe Divisibility ofRights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S389 (2002)
[hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification] ("The incentive of
each subsequent owner of the work to honor the restriction on resale might be enhanced by a
provision for substantial liquidated damages (for example, 50 percent of the sale price) in case
of breach."). As noted infra note 197, such clauses are not always enforceable, particularly
where the damages are disproportionate to any reasonable estimate of the harm suffered. On
the other hand, courts are more friendly to such clauses in situations such as this, where the
harm would otherwise be nearly impossible to prove with any degree of precision.
I leave aside any discussion of Hansmann and Kraakman's other suggestion for practical
enforceability of such an agreement, which is essentially one that involves coordinated control
of marketplaces: "An artist-or a group of artists or an artists' association-might also obtain
contractual commitments from galleries and auction houses that deal in their work not to broker
resales of the work in which the purchaser does not make the requisite contractual commitment
to the artist." Hansmann & Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification, supra, at S389. Of
course, this strategy requires the not-insignificant additional steps of organizing the artists and
convincing the galleries and auction houses, and it would only work if the cooperating parties
exercised sufficient market control. But it is an idea that interestingly spans the distinction
between purely private agreements and more public, community-type efforts.
The promulgators and supporters of the Artist's Contract believed that enforcement would
be greatly aided by the threat of social sanction or ostracization. As Hans Haacke, an artist
known to regularly and consistently use the agreement, stated in an interview: "Practically
speaking, a kind of gentleman's agreement is formalized by the Contract .... ." EICHHORN,
supra note 13, at 68. They believed that the relatively small, geographically concentrated
market of art buyers would pressure parties to honor the agreement for fear, if not of legal
enforceability, then ofreputational and social sanctions. I have explored the contract's meaning
within its original social context and the community from which it emerged in other work. See
generally Bradley & Frye, supra note 13 (exploring the origins of the Artist's Contract and its
influence on the art marketplace).
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The contract purports to bind all future collectors for up to twentyone years after the artist's death." But a breach of contract claim against
subsequent collectors would likely fail. The doctrine of privity of
contract teaches that only a party who has agreed to a contract is bound
by its terms.5 9 For this reason, the artist is unlikely to be able to enforce
the contract against a new collector, who paid a reasonable sum for the
art in good faith and without knowledge of the restrictions.
The contract purports to encumber the work itself with these
restrictions.6 0 It provides for the artist to retain a highly customized sort
of property interest in the work, regardless of whether the current
owner of the work signed or even saw the contract.6 The trouble is that,
traditionally, private parties do not have the unbounded power to
burden an item of personal property (such as a work of art) with such
restrictions, which can be referred to as "covenants in personal
property" or "servitudes in chattels." 6 2 Historically, restrictions of this
sort have been recognized only reluctantly,6 3 in particular identified
58.

See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text (noting some limitations to this).

59.

Privity, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ('The doctrine of privity means

that a person cannot acquire rights or be subject to liabilities arisingunder a contract to which
he is not a party." (quoting G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 538 (8th ed. 1991)). The
doctrine has certain exceptions not applicable here. See, e.g., Say. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195,
200 (1879) (holding that there is no privity of contract where an attorney provided information
to a client in response to a casual inquiry); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E 1050,
1054-55 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that a manufacturer of automobiles did owe a duty of care to
subsequent buyers and was responsible for automobiles placed in the market).
60.

ARTIST'S CONTRACT, supra note 4, art. 15 ("In the event the Work shall hereafter

be transferred or otherwise alienated from Collector or Collector's estate in any manner
whatsoever, any transferee taking the Work with notice of this Agreement shall in every respect
be bound and liable to perform and fulfill each and every covenant herein .... "); id. art. 16
("[T]he Collector's covenants do attach and run with the Work . . . .").
61. The key distinction is that if the artist has a property interest, it attaches to the
property, running along with it, as contrasted with a liability claim, which is usually personal
to the originally transacting party. The locus classicus on the crucial distinction between
liability and property interests is Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
LiabilityRules, andInalienability:One View ofthe Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
The Artist's Contract problem sketched in the main text aptly illustrates the reason the
distinction is so important. If artists have only claims against the original collector, that set of
rights is far less powerful than if they have claims on the property itself.
62. See Hansmann & Santilli, Authors'andArtists', supra note 40, at 101; see also,
e.g., Hansmann & Santilli, Royalties, supra note 39, at 260 (citations omitted) (noting, as to
ongoing rights running with the art past the initial collector, that "[i]n general, all legal systems
make it extremely difficult-indeed, for all practical purposes, nearly impossible-to create
and enforce such rights unless the law makes explicit provision for them, as it already does
nearly everywhere for copyrights and patents").
63. See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885,
887 (2008) ("Anglo-American common law has long been ambivalent about servitudes....");
see also Chad J. Pomeroy, A Theoretical Casefor Standardized Vesting Documents, 38 OIO
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forms, and with significant formal requirements, even on real property.
With respect to tangible personal property, there are few recognized
forms of encumbrance permitted to "run with property,"64 the most
prominent being security interests under the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) Article 9.6 Traditionally recognized encumbrances do
not include those contained in the Artist's Contract. In civil
jurisdictions, this limitation is traditionally referred to as the doctrine
of numerus clausus, which teaches that only a recognized number of
forms of property interest will be enforced by the courts. The common
law's legal rules generally approximate numerus clausus as well.66
The numerus clausus reluctance to recognize fine-grained,
bespoke divisions of property rights makes considerable sense. Several
overlapping justifications have been identified.6 7 Encumbrances on
property run afoul of the common law's general preference in favor of

N.U. L. REv. 957, 975-86 (2012) (discussing the details and costs of the numerus clausus
theory).
64. See Hansmann & Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification, supra note 57,
at S379 (discussing the limited ability that owners have to retain rights in their assets and bind
subsequent owners).
65. See infra Part IV.A.3.
66.
This doctrine has received considerable attention in legal scholarship. See, e.g.,
Hansmann & Santilli, Authors'andArtists', supra note 40, at 100-02 (discussing the law's
rationale in differentiating between encumbrances on real property and on personal property);
Hansmann, Property, Contract, and Verification, supra note 57 (discussing the feasibility of
property rights verification rules and alternative property rights regimes); Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardizationin the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (applying the civil law doctrine of numerus clausus to
analyze common law property rights); Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principlefor
Intellectual Property, 80 TENN. L. REv. 235, 240-42 (2013) (discussing the applicability of
tangible property law principles to intangible products); Van Houweling, supra note 63
(discussing the applicability of tangible property law principles to intangible products).
Numerus clausus and related doctrines play a role in several ongoing, important debates. Most
prominently, in intellectual property and technology law, scholarship has sought to evaluate the
practice of sellers imposing "licenses" on buyers, effectively encumbering their property rights
(often by adhesion contract), sometimes in service of anticompetitive and other questionable
goals. JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM
151-53 (2017); Mulligan, supra; Van Houweling, supra note 63.
See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 66, at 242 ("There are three primary benefits that
67.
have been advanced as justifications for the numerus clausus principle: maintaining the
alienability of property, minimizing information costs to third parties (as opposed to the
transferor and transferee) encountering property, and facilitating verification of ownership
rights. In other words, if the numerus clausus principle were eliminated, property rights would
be substantially more difficult to discover, comprehend, and convey." (internal footnotes
omitted)); Van Houweling, supra note 63, at 887-907, 890 ("[A]rticulat[ing] a new three-part
typology of servitude concerns: those related to notice and information costs, those related to
dead-hand control and other aspects of the 'problem of the future,' and those related to harmful
externalities.").
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the free alienability of property. 68 They add risk and expense to
transactions and may force buyers into extensive investigation prior to
transacting. If enforced, these divisions of property rights may work
inequity on parties who lack notice of them. These dangers are more
acute with respect to personal property, as opposed to real property.
Because items of personal property are more easily hidden, moved, or
manipulated, obtaining notice of restrictions on them is more difficult
and unreliable. 69 The transaction costs of forcing each potential
purchaser to discover and take into account such dangers before
purchase may overshadow the benefits of honoring such restrictions.70
If clear notice of the agreed-upon restrictions is attached to the
artwork, these concerns diminish somewhat because information costs
are lowered.7 It is even possible that under governing law, if notice
were provided and given the "special" type of purchase a work of art
might be thought to represent, 72 a court might apply principles of equity
and find a way to enforce some of the restrictions.7 3 But that is far from
certain. Even with a relatively clear notice affixed to a work, courts

68. The Supreme Court has referred to the centuries-old roots of "the common law's
refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of chattels," quoting Lord Coke to the effect that
such restraints are "against Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting betwee[n] man
and man." Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013) (quoting EDWARD
COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND § 360, at 223 (London,
Societie of Stationers 1628)).
69. You might be skeptical if someone offered to sell you the Brooklyn Bridge, and
investigating their claim of ownership (which would include the right to sell you the bridge)
would be relatively easy. But what if you walk past a street vendor offering to sell you a
painting of the Brooklyn Bridge? Investigating the title to the work would be difficult at best.
Notably, and perhaps surprisingly from a policy perspective, courts have enforced some
forms of encumbrance including life estates. See Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 875 (N.Y
1986) (upholding inter vivos gift of painting from father to son with father retaining life estate,
and actual possession, of the painting). But such cases are rare.
70. See Hansmann & Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification, supranote 57;
Van Houweling, supra note 63, at 924 (articulating some different aspects of these potential
costs and benefits).
71. Hansmann and Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification, supranote 57, at
S389 ("To add further to the viability of this approach, the artist might (in the case of a painting,
for instance) attach a notice to the back of the work stating the terms of the initial contract.").
72. Particularly if the artist is living. For some factors that do arguably separate art
purchases from those of other forms of personal property, see infra Part M.A.
73. Hansmann & Kraakman suggest that it is possible that if a court were to find that
a burden of having provided sufficient notice were carried, it might honor a novel "right" -in
their example, to weekday use of an "heirloom watch." Hansmann & Kraakman, Property,
Contract, and Verification, supra note 57, at S416; see also Van Houweling, supra note 63, at
932 ("[I]t is often possible physically to attach some form of written notice to an object of
personal property [communicating an encumbrance]. Courts and commentators differ in their
assessment of the effectiveness of such labels.").
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would recognize that commerce could be considerably inhibited by the
inclusion of unusual encumbrances. For instance, a buyer might
struggle to understand the terms and contours of the various divisions
of rights, or might reasonably question the authenticity of the notice
itself, or might even assume that the notice was merely a grab for legal
rights that are in fact not binding. All sorts of scenarios could arise in
which the validity and priority of competing claims to property rights
would be unclear under governing law.74 For these reasons, courts
following traditional doctrinal approaches would likely hesitate to
enforce the purported encumbrance on the artwork.
This Article explores, below, the ways in which existing law can
to divide property rights in artworks" and ways in which the
used
be
law could be changed to implement a system allowing for such
divisions to be more easily accomplished.7 6 But the Artist's Contract
itself would likely be unenforceable as to "strangers" to the original
deal.
2.

Copyright

In addition to the problems with contractual privity and the
reluctance to recognize encumbrances on personal property, the Artist's
Contract likely runs afoul of copyright law. To see why, it is necessary
to understand how copyright law affects what is bought and sold in a
typical art transaction.
Fine art fits awkwardly within copyright law.77 Generally,
copyright law protects "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression," including "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works."" But even a unique artwork (e.g., Van Gogh's The
Starry Night, 1889) is not itself considered an "original work[] of
authorship." 79 The painting is considered only a particular instantiation,
For instance, does such a claim survive a bankruptcy filing? Can a creditor levy on
74.
the property? If so, after the sheriff's sale, does the new owner own the property free and clear
of the restriction? The possible issues are manifold.
See infra Part IA.
75.
See infra Part IV.B.
76.
For convenience, this discussion employs a conventional notion of art and
77.
artworks. Conceptual art, for instance, which can consist of words or actions performed in
some way by the artist, would have to be analyzed differently. "Ownership" of such
"immaterial" art is often conveyed merely through a certificate or letter, sometimes signed and
numbered by the artist.
78. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2018).
79. Id. § 102(a); see Krista L. Witanowski, Do Tiger Woods, Dustin Hoffnan, and
Other Celebrities Own Information About Themselves?, 20 COMM. LAW. 18, 21 (2002);
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a "particular copy," of the "original work" as conceived by the artist.so
Even after selling that "particular copy" (maybe the only one in
existence), artists retain the rights to reproduce their "original work,"
either in the same media (e.g., on a canvas) or in other media (e.g., on
a refrigerator magnet)."
Collectors of most artworks receive rights similar to those of
purchasers of a book from a bookstore. They have no right to copy it
further, but pursuant to the first sale doctrine, they may display or resell
the object as they wish.82 Courts are divided on the degree to which
they will honor a collector's contractual waiver of these rights, but even
if a contractual waiver is binding on an initial buyer, it will not bind a
downstream buyer due to the first sale doctrine.8 3 The rationale of this
doctrine largely tracks the rationale of the numerus clausus reluctance
to recognize other attempted encumbrances on property after it has
been sold.84
Several important provisions of the Artist's Contract run afoul of
the first sale doctrine. Among other things, the first sale doctrine would
likely invalidate the artist's right to obtain the art for exhibition for up
to sixty days every five years and the requirement that the collector
obtain the artist's advice and consent before publicly exhibiting the
art.85 The Artist's Contract has an enforcement problem as a result of
these obstacles in copyright law in addition to the barriers presented by
general property and contract law.

Richard Thomson, Vincent Van Gogh The Starry Night (2008), https://www.moma.org/moma
org/shared/pdfs/docs/learn/courses/Thomson VanGogh The StarryNight.pdf. The work is
in the collection of the Museum of Modem Art in New York City.

80.

17 U.S.C.

§ 109.

81.
See id. § 106. They can, of course, license such rights to others specializing in such
efforts. The text describes my understanding of current U.S. law. Several provisions were
different at the time of the original Artist's Contract, although not in any ways that affect the
analysis herein. See, e.g., Hansmann & Santilli, Authors'andArtists', supra note 40, at 115

(discussing default rules regarding transfer of copyright prior to 1976); van Haaften-Schick,
supra note 13, at 42 n.2 (summarizing law prior to 1976).

82.

17 U.S.C.

§ 109(a) (sale); id. § 109(c) (display); see Frye, Equitable Resale

Royalties, supra note 6, at 246-49 (explaining doctrine and collecting further sources).
83.
On the enforceability of waivers of the "first sale" rights, see Guy A. Rub,
ContractingAround Copyright: The Uneasy Casefor Unbundling ofRights in Creative Works,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 258-59 (2011) [hereinafter Rub, ContractingAround Copyright]; Guy
A. Rub, Rebalancing CopyrightExhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 809 (2015).

84.

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538-39 (2013). The Supreme

Court has held that a similar rationale holds in the context of patents. See Impression Prods.,
Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017). 1 am grateful to David 0. Taylor for
help on these points.
85.
ARTIST'S CoNTRAcr, supra note 4, arts. 7, 8.
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The So!ution

The pree ding subpart outlined obstacles to the Artist's Contract
as an enforceable legal document. It is merely one example of a
common problem. One can easily imagine situations where parties
aside from artists mi
r into related problems as they seek to
customize their ongoing rights and responsibilities with respect to a
given item of property.
This subpart lays out a proposed solution to such prob mIs usin
abusiness entity. And just as it is easy to see how many commercial
actors could share a version of the Artist's Contract problem, this
solution, too, could b generalized to many other scenarios.
Consider the sale of awork of ar, such as the painting below by
artist Wayne Adams, Church 2006) depicted in Figure 1. If Adams
wanted to sell the painting while retaining protections such as those
conmtied in the Artist's Contraict, he could of course have his dealer
present the collctor with that contract for signature. If the collector
wants the art, she will sign the contract. But the enforeability will be
uncertain at best, particularly as time passes and the art changes hands.
Figure 1: Wayne Adams' Church (2006)16

86.
artist.

Oil on Cinvas. 48" x 60". Used by perission of the artist. Photograph by the
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There is an alternative. As Figure 2 illustrates, Adams might
instead place the object into a business entity, such as an LLC-call it
Wayne Adams &Church (2006), LLC-that will own the art. He would
sell the collector an ownership interest in the entity, a "membership
interest" in LLC parlance. The membership interest would come with
specified rights: It would permit the collector to do anything that she
can normally do with art, with the exception of whatever restrictions to
which she and the artist have agreed. The collector could sell to a new
collector at any future point-but again, what would actually be sold
would be the membership interest, not the art itself.
Adams himself would retain a membership interest. His interest
would reflect whatever he and the collector have agreed for him to
retain: if they follow the Artist's Contract's terms, his interest would
include the resale royalty right, the right to veto exhibitions, and the
right to borrow the artwork for exhibition." To protect the arrangement,
any sale of the actual art would require the consent of both members of
the LLC.
The governing documents of the entity-called the "operating
agreement" in the LLC context-would spell out all of this. Adams
could repeat this process with each work of art that he sells. Ultimately,
a form agreement could be produced, as with the original Artist's
Contract. Artists and collectors could familiarize themselves with the
standard terms and customize the agreement at will.

Upon the death of the artist, the operating agreement could follow the lead of the
87.
original Artist's Contract and provide that the artist's heirs or successors would receive the
membership interest for some amount of time, potentially with some of the rights (e.g., veto
rights over exhibiting the art) no longer valid.
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Figure 2:

Wayne Adlams.'s Church (2006), LLC

D eto0th liber1Clil of m1L1od 1b 1sinss law, nithr pa. would
1hCespon1i1 lties or duties to each other, or to the LLC, beyond what
the operating agreement specifes. Delaware makes clear its deference
to a well-afted agreement betw Cn the parties: "It is the policy of this
chapter to give the maxim effect to the princip of freedom of
contract and to the enfbrceability of limited liability company
agreements."" Even if fiduciary duti usuAll wOuld 1pplyap ib een
members of an LLC, moden business law permi the parties to
diclaim such duties, leaving only the im1plied contra ctual ovenant of
ood faith and fair dealing,"" The burd en imposed by this duty is light
neither artist nor coll ctor from their other artistic
and would cons1 am11C
activities or busi
dealings188. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2019). Many other states' statutes share this
language.
89. Id 181101(c).
90. See Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1128 (Del. 2010) (describing remedies for
its breach as "limited and extraordinary". It amounts to a duty not to "act[ arbitrarily or
unreasonably, thereby frustrating the fruits of the bargain" that the parties have struck. Id at

1126. It does not supplement a contract with duties from outsde that agreement itself
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The costs of the formation and operation of a Delaware LLC are
extremely minimal. Formation costs less than one hundred dollars and
annual state taxes are only a couple of hundred dollars, regardless of
the size of the LLC's assets; some states are even cheaper.9 1 The artist
would require legal advice and other professional services, but only
minimal advice would be necessary after the initial setup costs. Most
of a lawyer's time would be spent drafting the terms of a basic Art LLC
operating agreement, which could then be customized easily as the
parties desire. The Artist's Contract itself could furnish much of the
content of the contract with simple terms added regarding LLC
structure and governance. Transaction costs could diminish further
with standardization. If the idea were to take off, art industry groups or
nonattomey legal service providers (e.g., websites providing sample
forms) might enter the field, or Delaware or another state might
develop particular templates or protections for Art LLCs, in order to
garner a larger share of the Art LLC market.
Delaware's required disclosures are almost comically minimal.
Indeed, they are so minimal that in part for this reason, Delaware is
sometimes classified as a "tax haven" alongside jurisdictions such as
the Cayman Islands.92 Information about the transaction itself could be
kept almost entirely private. The parties to the contract-i.e., the
members of the LLC-appear on no public record, and no annual
91. See Annual Report and Tax Instructions, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corp.delaware.
gov/paytaxes/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (annual tax of $300 and no requirement to file an
annual report); DEL. DEP'T OF STATE, Div. OF CORPS, FEE SCHEDULE (2018), https://corpfiles.
delaware.gov/Augustfee2018.pdf (stating $90 initial filing fee for LLC).
As far as other states being cheaper, see, for example, KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 141.0401(2)(a) (2019), https://codes.findlaw.com/ky/title-xi-revenue-and-taxation/ky-revst-sect-141-0401.html (stating minimum annual LLC tax of $175); WYo. SEC'Y OF STATE, Bus.
Div., FEE SCHEDULE (2018), https://soswy.state.wy.us/Business/docs/BusinessFees.pdf
(quoting initial filing fee of $100 and annual tax of the greater of $50 or $0.0002 per dollar of
assets held in Wyoming); Ky. SEC'Y OF STATE, FEES (2012), https://www.sos.ky.gov/
bus/business-filings/Pages/Fees.aspx (stating initial LLC Articles of Organization fee of $40).
It is possible that federal tax returns would be generated, and there would be additional
tax consequences in the (rather unlikely) event the art were to generate income. These are
matters that would require some professional advice. But the consequences are likely to be
fairly minimal in the usual case.
92. Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y TIMES
(June 30, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-acorporate-tax-haven.html ("Delaware is the state that requires the least amount of
information,... Basically, it requires none. Delaware has the most secret companies in the
world and the easiest to form." (quoting a chief executive of a registration agent in Delaware)).
I singled out Delaware because it remains the dominant state for business entities to choose as
their domicile, but other states-Nevada, Montana, and South Dakota, among plenty of
others-are not qualitatively different from Delaware in degree of disclosure required.
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reports are required.93 The statute permits information about the LLC's
membership to be hidden deep within several nested layers of secrecy.
In specific: To form and maintain an LLC, only a "registered agent" of
the LLC need be identified. This agent need have nothing to do with
the company. There are businesses that serve as registered agents for
thousands of LLCs.94 In fact, the "registered agent" need not know
anything about the company. The agent must only have the contact
information of one "natural person who is a member, manager, officer,
employee or designated agent" of the LLC.95 Even that "designated
agent" need not have any real information about the LLC, until need
arises: Only when a designated agent contacts the LLC and requests
such information need the LLC provide the contact information for "a
natural person who has access to" the name and contact information of
members of the LLC.9 6 In other words, an outside party's demand for
such rudimentary information as a list of the LLC members has to
proceed to the "registered agent" (the only publicly disclosed name),
and then to the "designated agent," and then to a "natural person who
has access to" the names and contact information for LLC members.97
The statute provides no express procedure for obtaining the operating
agreement itself and lays out no requirements for who must have access
to it. Yet compliance with these extremely minimal disclosure
requirements is enough to permit the entity to operate throughout the
United States.98
93. Annual Report and Tax Instructions, supra note 91; Rick Bell, Delaware LLC
Privacy: What's on Public Record?, DELAWAREINC.COM (July 2, 2019), https://www.delaware
inc.com/blog/what-is-on-public-records-delaware/. Of course, some legal attention will have
to be paid to the structure of the initial sale, which might well require disclosure of aspects of
the transaction to taxing authorities. But given that these disclosures, under the proposed Art
LLC structure, are unlikely to be any more onerous than under a usual sales contract, I leave
these factors aside.
94.

See, e.g., C.T. CORP., REGISTERED AGENT SERVICES, https://ct.wolterskluwer.com/

registered-agent-services (last visited Dec. 5, 2019) ("Trusted by ... more than 300,000
businesses since 1892."). Aregistered agent can be procured for as low as $50. Suzanne Barlyn,
Special Report: How DelawareKept America Safe for CorporateSecrecy, REUTERS (Aug. 24,
2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-delaware-bullock-specialreport/special-reporthow-delaware-kept-america-safe-for-corporate-secrecy-idUSKCN1OZl OH. Approximately
200 agents apparently serve Delaware's 1.2 million existing entities. Id
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-104(g) (2019) (emphasis added).
Id.; id. tit. 6, § 18-305(h) (emphasis added).
96.
97. Id. tit. 6, § 18-104(g). Of course, the member could be another LLC, thus
interposing yet more layers of secrecy before the discovery of the natural persons involved in
the actual transactions.
98. See supranote 12. Delaware law will govern most aspects of the entity's structure
and governance. Id This is not to say that states can't impose requirements on companies doing
business within their borders. See, e.g., Lidow v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729, 736-
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Through this Art LLC, the relationship between Wayne Adams
and his collector is virtually indistinguishable from that imagined in the
Artist's Contract-but is legally enforceable.9 9 The identified problems
with the Artist's Contract disappear. Privity exists because a subsequent
collector acquires not the art but the membership interest in the LLC;
in purchasing that interest, the collector agrees to be bound by the
operating agreement. The numerus clausus problem also disappears
because no matter how many times possession of the art changes, its
ownership remains with the LLC. Likewise, the first sale doctrine does
not apply because the only "sale" would be the initial one from the artist
to the business entity.' The Art LLC approach imposes little additional
burden at the time of sale, or afterwards, thanks to Delaware's low
costs, minimal disclosure requirements, and openness to the removal
of traditional fiduciary duties.
Thus, the Art LLC appears to be a viable solution to the Artist's
Contract problem. Not the solution: As discussed below, other solutions
could be imagined too, both under existing law and through new
legislation.'0 ' And this approach raises some new risks, also explored
below. But the Art LLC serves as an apt example of the power and ease
of modern business entity law, providing a strikingly simple solution to
an otherwise difficult problem.
III.

THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF SCULPTING PROPERTY RIGHTS BY
PRIVATE AGREEMENT

A.

The Logic of the Art LLC

It has long been recognized that business firms can be analyzed as
a nexus of a number of interlocking contracts and that many business
goals can be accomplished either through contracts (e.g., with a
supplier or an independent contractor) or through organization as a firm
(e.g., through vertical integration with the supplier or the creation of an
37 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (applying California law to alleged dismissal in violation of public
policy of the CEO of a Delaware corporation based in California).
99. As noted elsewhere, there are uncertainties raised by this novel approach that I am
not intending to deny or minimize (and while this Article provides a rough sketch of a workable
scheme, it does not provide the particularized blueprint necessary to implement it).
100. It is possible that for legal reasons, the artist could actually create the art for the
business entity, for instance as a "work for hire," and thus the art might not ever be sold to the
entity but would belong to the entity from the start. These types of details are beyond the scope
of this Article but illustrate that there are ample other ways in which the legal arrangements
could be tweaked to address whatever preferences or problems might arise.
101. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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employment relationship).1 0 2 It is increasingly clear that the corollary
is also the case: Many goals traditionally conceived of as "merely"
transactional in nature can be accomplished best through the forms of
business organization. This fact has gained particular importance
because of the liberality of modem business entity law and the
capacities of recordkeeping and communication that have made
possible the creation, organization, and maintenance of virtually
innumerable entities.
The Art LLC exemplifies this trend. The Art LLC is a business
entity used to accomplish a particular transaction that might not be
possible otherwise. Its operating agreement is a sort of super-contract,
able to accomplish what other contracts cannot, while adding no duties
and relatively minimal expense.' 03
Business law itself provides few limitations on how entities can
be created and used. Traditional limitations on the structures or range
of uses of business entities have eroded almost entirely. Parties are able
to organize themselves any way they want and for nearly any purpose.
Even a single individual can create and act through a "corporate" entity.
In an age of very low disclosures, even the requirement that businesses
only be organized to engage in "lawful" activity doesn't seem
particularly meaningful; regulators find it hard to determine, for
instance, general compliance with tax laws. The frontiers continue to
expand. Highly insightful and creative scholars have been addressing
how to create "zero member" entities, which are controlled by artificial
intelligence.' 0 4

102. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FN. ECoN. 305, 311(1976)
("[I]t makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things which are 'inside' the firm ...
from those things that are 'outside' of it. There is in a very real sense only a multitude of
complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of
labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output."); id. at 311 ("The private
corporation or firm is simply one form of legalfiction which serves as a nexusfor contracting
relationships....").
103. See supra Part H.C.
104. See, e.g., Shawn Bayern, The Implications ofModern Business-EntityLaw for the
Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 93, 96 (2015) (proposing that
autonomous systems may be able to operate like legal persons under current laws governing
LLCs); Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member

LLC, 108 Nw. U. L. REv. 1485, 1486 (2014) (discussing the possibilities of software
conducting business on its own); Carla L. Reyes, IfRockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 373 (2019) (proposing a resurrection of the business trust model for smart-contract
based organizations).
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Viewing an art sale as a business entity seems unusual at first-a
strange artifice foisted upon what should be a simple transaction. Upon
reflection, however, and in light of the expanding conception of
business enterprises embedded in modem business law and practice,
one's perspective might change. It starts to seem obvious, even
inescapable, that the relationship of artwork, artist, and collector forms
a sort of ongoing joint enterprise.'o Artists and their art are never really
separate; the success or failure of one affects the other. The "brand" of
the artist depends on the artwork in all sorts of ways, both obvious (is
it good?) and nonobvious (is it thought to be good by people who are
currently influential in the art market?). And of course, the artwork's
value depends profoundly on the artist's reputation or "brand." Because
the artist and the collector often share ongoing interests, the ability to
make several binding, interrelated agreements concerning such
interests might add value. Of course, the artist and collector are not coventurers in the heightened and duty-freighted sense that Cardozo
expressed, but thoroughly arm's-length (not to say sharp-elbowed)
participants in commerce.' 0 6 With them, the goal is to establish rights
that require minimal trust in the counterparty and that will be binding
against third parties, even if that counterparty defects from the duties
they have undertaken. Modem business entities suit this task well. Art
LLCs might begin to look less like a clever work-around and more like
an accurate expression of the ongoing-but still loose-connection of
the artist to the work after it leaves the artist's hands. Instead of "why a
business entity?" one might come to ask, "why not a business entity?"
Traditional moral rights can be seen as a way of recognizing the
business-venture-type relationship between artists and collectors.' 07
They provide a means for artists to maintain some control over their
reputation and to benefit from their work over time. They also ensure
that collectors receive something more than the mere physical object in
their possession-the right to connect, intangibly, that object with the
reputation and career of its creator. Of course, when mandated by law
105. And not just in this context: As familiarity increases, expectations change and the
use of cheap, disposable business entities for everyday transactions over a given amount might
become a default.
106. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y 1928) ("Joint adventurers,
like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest
loyalty ... Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior.").
107. Hansmann & Santilli, Authors'andArtists', supra note 40, at 142 ("[S]ervitudes
[such as those imposed by some moral rights] can potentially serve a useful role in the field of
fine arts, particularly in controlling reputational externalities.").
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and un-waivable, moral rights may provide an inefficient amount of
ongoing connection. But such rights can be seen as emerging from an
accurate impulse to recognize an ongoing connection. The Art LLC
arrangement may be an improvement over traditional moral and resale
royalty rights if it allows parties greater control over their own
relationships, to bargain over what particular rights are valuable to
them. 0 8

More recent ideas for allowing parties to create and maintain such
connections without legislative intervention have arisen. In 2018, art
market expert Amy Whitaker advanced a proposal that artists keep an
"equity interest" in their art (she uses 10% as her example).' She
proposes these "shares" be alienable by the artist at any point, such that
the artist could reap some profits from rising values even aside from
times when collectors actually decide to engage in secondary sales of
their art." 0 Professor Whitaker emphasizes "the ways that shared
ownership can create meaningful support and patronage for artists at
an early stage of their careers" and calls for more exploration of market
mechanisms to spread risk and support artists."' Without taking a view
as to her particular proposals, the resurgence of several of the
motivating ideas behind the Artist's Contract in the guise of modem
financial thinking suggests that the Art LLC may be an idea whose time
has come.
It could be objected that the policies allegedly behind the doctrinal
limitation have been lost. This Article presents the argument that the
Art LLC would permit the parties to divide property rights in the art,
and that the limitations would run with the art. By transforming the
Artist's Contract into an operating agreement, traditional limits on the
parties' ability to divide property rights are lost, with very little
108. A potential objection might be that there is a societal interest in moral rights even
beyond those that an artist might choose: Society itself benefits when work is attributed
correctly, left undestroyed, etc. But as Professor Adler has pointed out, existing moral rights
laws effectively leave individual artists as the only protectors of such rights, so this theory
draws little support from experience. See Adler, supra note 44, at 272.
109. Whitaker, Artist as Owner, supra note 43, at 55.
110. See id. at 55-56. She focuses on more future-looking legal approaches to the
problem, such as blockchain-based registers of the proposed art ownership interests; thus, her
idea is of limited help in addressing the central issues in this Article. But it is intriguing on its
merits, and she fascinatingly articulates the rationales that might motivate such an arrangement.
See id. at 56, 58-59. Of course, the Art LLC as proposed here would provide a good vehicle
for this type of reservation of equity interests, and the operating agreement of an Art LLC could
be drafted as to make interests alienable in the way Whitaker proposes.
111. Amy Whitaker, Ownershipfor Artists, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF ARTISTIC PROPERTY

70, 71, 85-86, 88-90 (Pablo Helguera et al. eds., 2014).

276

TULANE LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 94:247

additional cost to the parties. Artists could impose all sorts of
restrictions that might tie up art markets long after the initial
transaction.112 An LLC could give perpetual life to encumbrances,
haunting future sales with the threat of a "dead hand" from the past
reaching into the present. The concerns that motivated numerus
clausus-type restrictions in the first place would arise, and art markets
could be left to struggle with problems akin to those currently faced in
the copyright arena, where "orphaned works" of uncertain copyright
status are left underutilized. 13
Even if this is considered a regrettable outcome, there is little
likelihood of a remedy emerging from business law. The line-drawing
between "real" and "shell" business entities would be difficult and
costly, and neither federal nor state lawmakers have shown appetite for
it. In a world where ownership of property can be cloaked easily within
various webs of business entities, or transferred among them, the Art
LLC hardly seems anomalous. The use of affiliated entities as "mere"
conduits or repositories for property used mostly or entirely by other
entities is common in the world of sophisticated business and
finance. 14 The Art LLC is merely one apt example of the ongoing
democratization of these practices.
Raising the costs of establishing entities might deter these sorts of
work-arounds, of course. This doesn't seem like the right outcome
given that the Art LLC seems at least as analytically supportable a use
of business entities as many of the uses to which they are put by more
sophisticated actors. Perhaps there is a lower limit to how easy it should
be to create and maintain LLCs; some transactions really should remain
merely one-off transactions and nothing more."' Still, the Art LLC
demonstrates that at least with respect to items intended to endure

112. Professor Adler has written eloquently in opposition to moral rights on the basis
that they can give artists too much control over their works after creation. See, e.g. Adler, supra
note 44, at 274 (providing the example of an artist using moral rights arguments to resist the
public's interest in removing a work of art from a public area).
113. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works
Problem, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379, 1380-87 (2012).
114. Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and
Creditors'SelectiveEnforcement, 124 YALE L.J. 2680, 2704 (2015).
115. The purchase of a donut comes to mind. Cf Mitch Hedberg: Comedy Central
Special (1999)-FullTranscript, SCRAPS FROM LOFT (July 6, 2017), https://scrapsfromtheloft.

com/2017/07/06/mitch-hedberg-comedy-central-speciall999-full-transcript/ ("I bought a donut
And they gave me a receipt for the donut. I don't need a receipt for a donut. I'll just give you
the money. You give me the donut. End of transaction. We don't need to bring ink and paper
into this.").
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beyond a short horizon, the tools used by sophisticated multinational
businesses could be useful for everyday transactions as well.
But merely because business law has not provided-and may not
ever provide-meaningful restrictions on the use of business entities
for transactional purposes such as those exemplified by the Art LLC
arrangement does not mean that parties can simply run amok.
Numerous other bodies of law impact the uses of business entities for
purposes such as the Art LLC and some are discussed in the following
subpart.
B.

The Limits of the Art LLC

As this subpart shows, there are limits to how entities can be used.
It is just that these are largely imposed by other bodies of law. And,
going forward, if there are concerns about the effect that the
democratization of business entity law might have on commercially
unsophisticated parties, then there are remedies within reach: agency,
tort, consumer, or other related bodies of law could be tightened to
prevent abuse. The limits explored below are presented by way of
estimating the current baseline of laws impacting Art LLCs and of
encouraging further research into ways such restrictions could be
modified as new uses of business entities continue to emerge.
This subpart surveys five major bodies of law that constrain the
use and effectiveness of Art LLCs. First, agency law provides guidance
on the degree to which the proposed Art LLC can successfully restrict
the ability of collectors to sell art that is by all appearances owned by
themselves and not by any business entity. Second, U.S. securities laws
determine when the sale of membership interests in an Art LLC would
be required to meet the higher diligence and registration standards
prescribed for securities offerings. Third, laws generally prohibiting
fraud and abuse under criminal, commercial, and consumer laws deter
certain misuses of the Art LLC. Fourth, if the artist, collector, or the Art
LLC itself were to encounter financial distress, bankruptcy law would
determine the fate of the different stakeholders in the entity and its
assets. Finally, the disclosure rules of existing business law apply to the
Art LLC. While, as already noted, they are minimal, they nonetheless
might disturb the secrecy norms of the art world and so represent a
check on the Art LLC.
Overall, while there is ample room for debate about ideal
outcomes, the effects of these various bodies of law already provide a
reasonably coherent set of constraints, and more importantly, they are
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plausible policy levers for tightening or loosening constraints on
business entities that may be used to sculpt property rights by private
agreement.
1.

Agency Law

The Art LLC limits the ability of the collector to sell the work of
art because the collector doesn't own the art outright. The collector
owns a membership interest in the LLC, which owns the art. The
individual has the right to sell his interest in the Art LLC-but not to
sell the art itself The proposed operating agreement would provide that
the art itself cannot be sold without the consent of both members." 6
This restriction on the sale of the art is a central benefit of the Art LLC
scheme.
But what if the collector tries to circumvent this arrangement and
purports to "sell" the art anyway? He could thereby victimize an
innocent third party who had no idea that the person she was dealing
with-who actually had the art in his possession-didn't have the right
to sell the art. The dispute would then be as to whether the LLC still
had title to the art or whether title had passed validly to the new
collector.
Both this new (purported) collector, and the artist, would have
claims against the original collector for breach of contract and, likely,
fraud.1 17 But if, by the time the truth came out, the original collector
was judgment proof, or had died, or was beyond the jurisdiction of any
reasonably accessible court, then the battle becomes one that pits the
artist against the new collector. Either the artist or the new collector
would be left injured without much recompense.
The basic legal rule is that someone who lacks title to an item of
property cannot pass good title to someone else-even to a purchaser
in good faith."' An exception would be in the case where the original
collector is "in the business of selling goods of that kind," for instance,

116. The parties might agree for the operating agreement to provide that at the artist's
death, or some time thereafter, the property will become fully the property of the collector and
the LLC will dissolve.
117. Would a fraud claim lie against not just the original collector but also the entity
itself? It is conceivable but seems unlikely, because the entity was also harmed by the fraud.
118. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403 (AM. LAwINST.&UNw. LAwCOMM'N 2017) (specifying
basic rule that a purchaser can acquire the rights of a transferor and laying out exceptions not
relevant here).
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a professional art dealer.' 9 But let us assume the original collector was
not a professional art dealer (after all, if they were, that would
presumably make this sort of fraud unlikely, due to reputational
constraints). The issue boils down to a question of agency law. Can the
original collector, as a member of the LLC, validly sell its art, even
contrary to its operating agreement?
Members of an LLC routinely act as its agents.1 20 But here, the
original collector's authority as agent was limited by the operating
agreement, and the purported sale of the art exceeded that authority. So,
individual members have no actual authority to sell the art.1 2' The
purported new collector would have to argue that there was apparent
authority to sell the art or that the LLC is estopped from arguing that
authority was lacking.1 22 If there was authority, then the sale might be
valid despite its having not been authorized in the Art LLC's operating
agreement.
As far as apparent authority, the question would turn on whether
the Art LLC had made "manifestations" leading the new collector to
reasonably believe that the original collector had the authority to sell
the art.1 23 But in our hypothetical, the new collector wasn't aware of the
existence of the LLC; and if she had been, she would likely have been
on at least inquiry notice concerning whether the collector had the right
to dispose of the LLC's (sole!) item of property.1 24 Ultimately, this
seems a tough argument to sustain.

119. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (defining buyer in the ordinary course); see also id. §§ 2403(2), 9-320(a) (protecting buyers in the ordinary course from some security interests).
120. See generally BAYERN, CLOSELY HELD ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 7, at 244-50
(providing some sources and discussion of the relationship between LLC law and background
agency law).
121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
122. Id. §§ 2.03, 2.05, 2.06. This analysis uses the terminology and approach in the
Restatement (Third) of Agency Law. The exact contours of the resolution of the dispute would
turn on the governing state law.
123. Id.§ 3.03.
124. What if the original collector mentioned the LLC but stated that he had authority
from the LLC to sell the art? The argument here might be that the LLC "manifested" the
authority to sell the painting by giving the original collector possession of the object, to be kept
in her home or storage facility. The question here would likely turn on whether the
"manifestation" of possession was sufficient to support the apparent authority. The examples
of manifestations in the Restatement and in the case law are typically more direct-business
cards, email addresses, offices, titles, etc-even where they are held to be insufficient to
support a grant of apparent authority. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Recovery Express, Inc.,
415 F. Supp. 2d 6, 11 (D. Mass. 2006) (collecting cases and finding on the facts before it that
assigning the purported agent an email address was not sufficient to support apparent agency).
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A better argument is that either under principles of estoppel or as
an "undisclosed principal," the Art LLC is liable for the harm suffered
by the buyer. This could be either because the Art LLC "intentionally
or carelessly caused such belief' or because the buyer was "justifiably
induced to make a detrimental change in position" by the collector's
conduct, and that the principal, "having notice ... that it might induce
others to change their positions, did not take reasonable steps to notify
them" that possession of the artwork didn't include the right to sell it.125
Note that while technically it is the LLC whose conduct would be
questioned, in reality the question is more whether the artist, as the only
other member of the LLC, failed to cause the LLC to take steps to
protect her interest. If she did, she thereby lost her chance to recover
the art, on behalf of the LLC, but in fact for her own benefit, since under
our hypothetical the original collector presumably has left the scene
and functionally has no more interest in the dispute.
Has the artist (and thereby the LLC) acted "intentionally or
carelessly" merely by letting the collector possess the art?' 26 Or did the
mere fact of possession (without a hint of a pending sale) amount to
"notice" that others might be "induce[d]" to enter into a false
transaction? Those seem doubtful. After all, other bodies of law do not
hesitate to place burdens on buyers of goods from other private
individuals. Persons regularly have objects in their home that they don't
own outright. Art can be borrowed or rented.' 2 7 Or it can be owned by
some sort of business entity (perhaps for purposes of obtaining
financing, or some other sort of divided property right, as is the case
here). Or it could also be subject to a security interest in favor of a
lender.' 28 For instance, with respect to the risk of security interests, the
Uniform Commercial Code has no mercy in such matters:
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.05-2.06. The Restatement summarizes the
rationale for the estoppel rule as follows: "Estoppel's perspective is ... whether it is unjust, in
particular circumstances, to permit a principal who has chosen to deal through an agent but to
remain undisclosed to have the benefit of restrictions on the agent's authority." Id. § 2.06, cmt.
c. The Restatement also gives the relevant example of a cohabitating couple, one of whom
actually owns a property, but the other of whom purports to sell that property to a buyer, without
authorization of the owner. The owner is not liable for the mistake unless the owner is aware
of the erroneous understanding, in which case the owner is liable unless he fulfilled his duty to
correct the buyer's misunderstanding. Id § 2.06, illus. 5.

126. Id. § 2.05.
127. Laura Randall, Really Like That Painting? Why Not Take It Home!, N.Y TIMEs
(Mar. 30,2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/30/arts/artsspecial/really-like-that-paintingwhy-not-take-it-home.html.
128. Nonpurchase money security interests in household goods are prohibited in the
United States pursuant to federal regulation. 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2015). But the definition of
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[C]ollateral may be owned by a person other than the debtor against
whom the financing statement was filed. ... [T]he secured party remains
perfected even if it does not correct the public record. For this reason,
any person seeking to determine whether a debtor owns collateralfree
ofsecurity interests must inquire as to the debtor ' source of title and, if
circumstances seem to require it, search in the name of a former
owner.

29

Also, contact between artists (or their representatives) and the
collectors who purchase their art is not uncommon; collectors can
request information about the art's authenticity or provenance from
artists or their representatives.13 0 The new collector could protect
herself by attempting to reach out to the artist or by taking other steps
to research the art's true ownership.' 3 ' In our hypothetical, such contact

by the new collector, before or shortly after the time of transaction,
would render it less likely that the original collector's scam would
work.

For all of these reasons, a would-be collector who does not
investigate title already bears risks, originating in other areas of law,
even if no Art LLC is involved. 3 2 The new collector is likely to lose in
the Art LLC context as well. On these simple facts, the doctrine of
caveat emptor would probably apply.' 33 Although this outcome could
be challenged as a normative matter, it is less perverse than it might
seem at first glance. The possibility of the art actually being property
of an Art LLC is an additional risk to the collector but adds little burden:
It requires investigation along the lines of that required by several other
risks. Given the law's acceptance of these risks with respect to other
forms of divided property interests, it is hard to see why it should
disfavor interests held through a business entity such as an Art LLC.

"household goods" expressly excludes "works of art." Id. § 444.1(i)(1). Even an artwork in a
residence could be subject to either a purchase money or a nonpurchase money security
interest.
129. U.C.C. § 9-507 cmt.3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017) (emphasis

added).
130. Clearly, any artist interested in an Artist's Contract-type of arrangement would
welcome such contact, since many terms of the agreement rely on it.
131. Of course, it is possible that the artist could be unreachable or, depending on how
the documents are drafted, that the artist could transfer his interest to someone else whom the
new collector could not readily identify. A well-drafted operating agreement would need to
provide for such contingencies.
132. On the other hand, if the new collector is purchasing from an art dealer, then she
would be much more likely to prevail. See supranote 117 and accompanying text.
133. Caveat, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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All of this said, the hypothetical facts can be shifted to put the
artist's position in more jeopardy. If the artist had any hint or notice of
the sale and didn't take immediate steps to put the buyer on notice of
the LLC's ownership of the art, a court might be reluctant to side with
the artist. If the buyer sought to contact the artist or her representative
through reasonable channels but could not do so, that could also speak
against the artist's claims. Or if considerable time has passed after the
purported sale, it is conceivable that the court would seek equitable
grounds (such as laches) for finding that the LLC (through the artist)
should be deemed to have forsaken its claim by failing to keep track of
its purported property at reasonable intervals.134
To guard against these contingencies, the artist could take steps to
protect herself. She could respond to inquiries from those investigating
her works and correct misimpressions concerning ownership and
authority to sell, and she could occasionally touch base with collectors
and confirm the location of her works as well. What is more, with little
trouble she could provide an online registry of her works, easily found
with an Internet search, indicating the contours of the arrangements
under which they are actually owned. She could also take the practical
step included in the original Artist's Contract: put a notice on the
artwork itself where possible (or on a certificate of authenticity or other
document where not). These aren't foolproof steps, but they are
relatively easy, and they would bolster the artist's claim that reasonable
steps were taken to put inquiring parties on notice of the Art LLC
arrangement.
Arguments could be made for and against the outcomes I predict
above. One could imagine shifting the burden entirely to one side or
the other. For instance, to place the burden on the artist, a legal rule
could require a visible notice either on or near an artwork in order for
the claim of an Art LLC to be valid, which would require the artist to
monitor the artwork closely.135 As I will discuss in the following Part to
this Article, one could also imagine legal regimes that would supplant
the Art LLC, such as a central art registry where notice of the artist's
134. See, e.g, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006)
(assuming that this qualifies as an intentional or careless action equivalent to denying the

existence of any agency relationship).
135. Although I don't think this extreme a rule particularly advisable, it is not
completely infeasible. The development of the "Internet of Things" has made the remote
monitoring of physical objects much easier. See generally Christopher G. Bradley, Disrupting
Secured Transactions,56 Hous. L. REv. 965 (2019) (discussing improvements in the ability to
inexpensively and remotely monitor items with technology).

ARTWORKS AS BUSINESS ENTITIES

2020]

283

claims could be recorded.' 3 6 Arguably, however, current agency law
reaches at least a reasonable balance, honoring the essential form of the
Art LLC while leaving room for reallocation of liability where facts
support such an outcome. Importantly, too, there are ways in which
both participants in any art transaction can protect themselves without
incurring any great expense. This body of law, applied to the Art LLC,
incentivizes parties to take reasonable steps to protect themselves,
although it undermines the market facilitation concerns thought to
motivate the standard numerus clausus doctrine.
2.

Securities

Now I turn to the ways in which, although the basic arrangement
as described above would likely survive scrutiny under U.S. securities
laws, the laws impose limits on how Art LLCs could be operated.
Membership interests in LLCs sometimes constitute "securities,"
which are subject to stringent disclosure and sale requirements.' The
sale of interests by artists to collectors might constitute an offering of
securities with applicable securities law requirements concerning
registration and public disclosure.'3 8 Compliance with these
requirements would add considerable transaction costs and likely cause
parties to abandon the deal.' 39 Liability for offerors or sellers of
securities who don't comply is strict. Artists and auction houses likely
would not want to become securities dealers. This is a federal law
question because securities law preempts state business entity law so
that even if Delaware law indicated that LLC interests are not
securities, federal securities law would ultimately decide the issue.
Ultimately, federal securities law is unlikely to apply to most uses
of the Art LLC structure. But it would constrain schemes to use Art
LLCs to draw investors to "art sales" that are in fact structured or
marketed as "investment opportunities" requiring little involvement by

136.

See infra Part IV.B.

137. United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[B]ecause of the sheer
diversity of LLCs, membership interests therein resist categorical classification.").
138. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2018) (section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933). "Congress'
purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are
made and by whatever name they are called" and it therefore "enacted a definition of 'security'
sufficiently broad to encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment."

Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990).
139. Sales to so-called "accredited"-i.e., wealthy or financially sophisticatedinvestors can be immune from some requirements, but the exception would be difficult to meet
in the case of a public auction or gallery sale.
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the investor and designed to provide returns solely from the efforts of
the artist or her agents. This restriction is a sensible one.
The point of securities laws is to protect investors in an enterprise
from which they expect to receive a return. "The touchstone is the
presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial
or managerial efforts of others."l 40
1The analysis of whether
membership interests count as securities has several elements, as laid
out in the Howey test for an investment contract: "The three-prong test
for evaluating whether a particular transaction involves an investment
contract for securities is 'whether the scheme involves an
[1] investment of money in a [2] common enterprise with [3] profits to
come solely from the efforts of others."'l41
Most relevant for the Art LLC is the third prong, which is only
met if "the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones."'4 2 In the basic Art LLC structure
described above, this element is likely unmet. Undoubtedly, art can
increase in value based upon the artist's future efforts. Future artworks,
interviews, exhibits, and other work can boost the artist's reputation.
But it seems unlikely that the artist's post-sale efforts are "the
undeniably significant ones" with respect to the value of art acquired
by a collector.' 4 3 After all, an artwork's value will be "significant[ly]"
determined by various other factors as well: (1) its intrinsic qualities
(the skill and creativity it evidences); (2) the vagaries of art market
trends (mostly beyond the control of any individual artist); and (3) the
collector's own efforts in preserving, exhibiting, and marketing the
object.'" An artist might die or retire from creation shortly after the sale
without breaching any obligation, and without any clear or certain
effect on the value of the art. Indeed, at least in legend, the death of an
artist can spark eternal fame and higher prices. 14 In light of these
140. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
141. Rocky Aspen Mgmt. 204 LLC v. Hanford Holdings LLC, 230 F. Supp. 3d 159,
164-65 (S.D.N.Y 2017) (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946)).
142. Crowley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1975)
(emphasis added) (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.
1973)).
143. Id.
144. Cf Merryman, supra note 45, at 247,249-50 (discussing factors determining value
of art and noting lack of conclusive analysis of their relative importance).
145. A canonical expression of this belief is Mark Twain's marvelous story, in which
the author is told of a successful hoax that boosted the reputation and the earnings of a "dead"
artist and his coconspirators. See MARK TWAIN, Is He Living or Is He Dead?, reprinted in
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factors, it seems unlikely that in the usual instance, an Art LLC
membership interest sold to a collector would qualify as an investment
in securities under governing law.
The Art LLC might fail the second prong as well, the requirement
of a "common enterprise." For that analysis, most courts look to
whether there is either "horizontal commonality," meaning a pooling
of resources among investors with a similarly shared distribution of
returns, or "vertical commonality," meaning a linking of the fates and
fortunes of the "investor" (the collector) and the "promoter" (the
artist). 46 Either element suffices to meet this prong of the Howey test.
If the parties omitted a resale royalty right, it is unlikely that either
form of commonality would be present because the interests of the
artist and collector are distant and do not involve the sharing of profits
from future appreciation in the value of the artwork. Even with a 15%
resale royalty on any profitable sales within the term of the contract
(twenty-one years after the earlier of the death of the artist or her
spouse), the Art LLC might not meet this element given the artist's lack
of risk of loss and the limited financial interest she retains.14 As
mentioned, artworks are commonly held not just for investment but
also for consumption value; and artworks that increase in value might
often be held by collectors for longer than the term of the resale royalty
right under the Artist's Contract arrangement, for instance for tax
reasons, so that the artist (or her heirs) might never see any share of
profits even when a valuable and significantly appreciating work is
involved.' 4 8 But this would be a question of fact concerning the degree
to which the artist's overall expected value from the sale of the art
remains dependent on the future success of the "enterprise."
An Artist's Contract-like scheme could, however, become an
investment contract relatively easily, even if my analysis is correct that
the basic scheme I have presented wouldn't meet the Howey test. For
instance, the membership interest might be considered a security if the
scheme were marketed, or structured, so as to compel the artist to work
MARK TwAIN: COLLECTED TALES, SKETCHES, SPEECHES, & ESSAYS 1891-1910 (Louis J. Budd

ed., 1992).
146. Rocky Aspen Mgmt., 230 F. Supp. 3d at 165.
147. Cf In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493, 502 (S.D.N.Y 1987)
(finding vertical commonality and noting that "[a] contract where the promoter's and buyer's
fortunes are forever linked by profit-sharing, even when losses are not shared, can be an
investment contract and hence a security").
148. Wealthy collectors might not want to sell the art out of concern for capital gains
tax, which they could more easily avoid if the art simply passed to their heirs upon their death
via the stepped-up basis.
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in specific ways to increase the value of the specific work sold; or if the
artwork were marketed primarily based on the past "returns" on prior
works of the artist; or if the collector were obliged to sell the art in the
future at the direction of the artist or her agent; or if the interest that was
sold failed to identify a specific, existing work of art, but merely tied
future returns to the general, future work of the artist. All of the
conceivable modifications would shift, in meaningful ways, the type of
transaction toward one that is more purely in the nature of an
investment under governing law. Each modification would likely
require the seller or promoter of the scheme to comply with federal
securities law. Thus, federal securities law provides a limit to the uses
to which Art LLCs could be put.
Notably, the test of whether an investment is a "security" is
supposed to be one of substance, not form.'49 Accordingly, there is an
interesting question lurking here, which is whether even without the
separate LLC, the transaction under the originalArtist's Contract could
count as a securities transaction. After all, the point of the Art LLC is
simply to give the parties the same essential rights as they would have
under the Artist's Contract in a more reliably enforceable form. Is an
artwork sold under the Artist's Contract a security? The question isn't
frivolous, and the answer isn't obvious.' Art, of course, has a
consumption value-value deriving from the pleasure of aesthetic
contemplation as well as from its role as a status symbol. The Supreme
Court has held that "when a purchaser is motivated by a desire to use
or consume the item purchased . .. the securities laws do not apply."'5
For investors as to whom this is the predominant purpose, the issue is
likely settled.' 5 2 But many other collectors acquire art for speculative
or investment reasons.' For acquisitions of that sort, the Howey test

149. See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) ("[F]orm
should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality." (quoting

Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967))).
150. Syndicated interests in horses, for instance, can be securities. See generally
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Stallion Syndicates as Securities, 70 Ky. L.J. 1131 (1982)
(discussing the construction and operation of syndicates as strategies to avoid the creation of
securities).

151. Forman,421 U.S. at 852-53.
152. See, e.g., Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he key
to defining the scope of the securities laws is whether the transaction is primarily for
commercial (i.e., motivated by a desire to use, consume, occupy or develop), or for investment

purposes.").
153. Notably, in United HousingFoundation, Inc. v. Forman, "investors were attracted
solely by the prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not by financial returns on their
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sketched above might apply. The outcome again would depend on the
degree to which the agreement between artist and collector is marketed
or structured as one in which the value of the artwork depends on the
future efforts of the artist, and the degree to which the artist and investor
share a common fate based on the profits or losses associated with the
work of art. Under the standard Artist's Contract arrangement, the art
sale is unlikely to be a transaction in securities under federal law, but
again, meaningful modifications to that basic agreement might well
trigger securities law.
3.

Fraud, Abuse, and Equity

Laws prohibiting commercial fraud or consumer abuse apply to
the Art LLC and constrain the parties involved. To see why this is a
risk, recall the context of this discussion. The Artist's Contract is mostly
or entirely binding as between the artist and the initial collector. The
problems begin to arise when that collector, or a subsequent one, does
not abide by these contractual obligations-for instance, by selling the
art and then disappearing. The resulting conflict lies between the artist,
on the one hand, who believes the contract terms should have applied
to the sale and that they bound the new possessor, and the new collector,
on the other hand, who naturally thinks differently. The initial collector
committed fraud, potentially as to both the artist and the new collector,
and is susceptible to civil (and perhaps criminal) liability as a result.
But we assume that the fraudster is no longer available to make the
injured parties whole.
I have argued that the Art LLC eradicates a number of
enforcement problems presented by the original Artist's Contract. That
said, the arrangement might look inequitable as to the defrauded new
collector who has been taken in by the lies of the fraudster. Such a
subsequent collector will not react well when the artist seeks to recover
the art, claiming that it remains LLC property. While the discussion of
agency law above showed that the LLC might prevail in a dispute, other
bodies of law might protect deceived and defrauded collectors.
Limited liability companies are creatures of state law. There can
be consequences if the LLC form is being used as a tool of fraud or
inequity, contrary to state law. Such an allegation might follow two
possible lines of attack: (1) The LLC's operating agreement could be

investments." 421 U.S. at 853 (emphasis added). The Court acknowledged but did not resolve
the issue of what would happen in the "more difficult" case of mixed motives. Id. at 853 n.17.
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deemed void as contrary to public policy, or (2) the aggrieved party
could seek to "pierce the corporate veil" and hold the artist liable for
the harm done by the other member of the LLC.
As for the first line of attack: Upon motion of the Delaware
Attorney General, a Delaware court can cancel the certificate of
formation of an LLC "for abuse or misuse" of the LLC's "powers,
privileges[,] or existence."l5 4 But the statute doesn't define what would
constitute such abuse and generally provides that "[a] limited liability
company may carry on any lawful business, purpose[,] or activity,
whether or not for profit, with the exception of the business of
banking.""' Perhaps an argument could be made that the Art LLC isn't
"carry[ing]on . . . business" of any sort and thus falls outside of the
statute's protection, because it's really just a vehicle of ownership, a
glorified sales contract, and not any sort of recognizable business. But
this runs afoul of existing realities. Many thousands of Delaware LLCs
exist, and many do about the same amount of "business" as the Art
LLC (or less). There are inactive subsidiaries, passive tools for holding
assets, and so on. It seems unlikely that Delaware authorities will
undertake the difficult and possibly quixotic task of distinguishing
between "real" business entities and "business entities in name only,"
particularly if the effort would weed out many thousands of tax-paying
entities from the corporate books.
A related argument could be that the Art LLC's attempt to "endrun" around other bodies of law in order to divide property rights by
private agreement amounts to an "abuse or misuse" of statutory rights.
This again seems overbroad, potentially sweeping in too many current
business entities and practices to succeed as a practical matter.
Conceptually, too, this claim cannot succeed absent an appeal to some
sort of independent standard of what is "abuse or misuse." Business
entity law clearly permits the use of entities to evade certain bodies of
law that, hypothetically, would apply if the firm were organized
differently or were a sole proprietorship. Limited liability itself
prevents certain tort claims from being brought against owners of a
corporation, contrary to what would happen without a corporate entity
being in place. Yet taking advantage of the LLC form in order to limit
liability is well accepted in practice.
The second line of attack would be through veil piercing. The
defrauded collector whose rights are attacked could seek to pierce the
154. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-112(a) (2019).
155. Id. § 18-106(a) (emphasis added).
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veil of the LLC. Presumably this would mean asking a court to
disregard the LLC form and hold that the operating agreement is, in
reality, a contract between only the artist and the original collector,
binding only those parties. This would render the agreement
inapplicable to the new collector, who now would own the art without
restriction.15 6
In general, Delaware law permits a court to pierce the veil of a
business entity only (1) "where there is fraud," or (2) "where [the
entity] is in fact a mere instrumentality or alter ego of its owner"' and
"an overall element of injustice or unfairness is present."' The test fits
awkwardly with the imagined circumstances here. After all, the LLC is
in a sense also an injuredparty. The original collector-one of its two
members-sold the LLC's property without authorization and without
complying with the terms of the operating agreement. The artist, the
remaining member of the LLC, is merely seeking to recover property
that the LLC's faithless other member converted.
Although the original collector may well have committed fraud
vis-d-vis the new collector by misrepresenting himself as the actual
owner of the art, it is hard to see how the LLC or artist could be said to
have committed this fraud, since they were also injured by it. This
assumes a lack of any involvement by the artist, and/or proper
authorization under the LLC's operating agreement, as seems
plausible: The very mention of the LLC's or artist's ongoing
involvement with the art would likely have put the new collector on
sufficient notice to investigate, and ultimately scuttle, the fraudulent
transaction. If the artist were involved in, or even aware of, the
fraudulent transaction ahead of time and failed to prevent it, the answer
might be different; neither she nor the LLC would likely be able to
evade shared responsibility for the injury. But if the original collector
were the only bad actor, his fraud should not be attributed to the LLC.

156. Other versions of this basic line of attack are possible. For instance, the aggrieved
later collector could argue that the artist should be liable for any fraud or other tortious behavior
engaged in by the original collector. The analysis and the results would likely be similar in any
case.
157. NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992)). As the court
instructs in NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Communications, courts have largely adopted the
analysis for piercing the corporate veil in standard corporations to the LLC context. Id. For
some aspects of LLCs, such as abiding by corporate formalities, the traditional tests do not fit
particularly well.
158. Trevino v. Merscorp, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 521, 528 (D. Del. 2008).
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The alter-ego theory fits even more poorly. The LLC seems
unlikely considered a "mere instrumentality" of its two members. The
extensive terms of the operating agreement would outline distinct
interests of the two members, which the LLC was established to
protect. It was not intended to be a "mere instrumentality" of either of
them. Even if it were, is an "overall element of injustice or
unfairness ... present," such that the extraordinary remedy of veil
piercing might be available?' It is difficult to pin down exactly where
the injustice or unfairness lies because the fraudster has also victimized
the artist and LLC itself. Again, factors weighing against the artist's
claim to recover the art and protect her interests might include an artist
sitting on her alleged rights for a long period of time, or missing
opportunities to correct the new collector's misunderstanding, and thus
passively abetting the fraud. Alternatively, a clear notice attached to the
artwork might be a strong factor in the artist's favor. In the end, absent
unusual circumstances, piercing the veil seems unlikely.
Finally, there is the possibility of remedies based on consumer
protection laws. Federal and state laws generally prohibit "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 60 The scope of
prohibited conduct under these so-called UDAP laws, and the remedies
available, vary greatly. On the whole, the statutes are much less proconsumer or anti-fraud than they might seem. Many causes of action
are available only to public authorities such as the Federal Trade
Commission or state attorneys general. Some statutes offer private
rights of action but limit claims in various ways, such as permitting
plaintiffs only to pursue the initial party with whom they contracted
(which might prevent a claim here).
All of that said, an aggrieved new collector might try to make out
a claim under these laws, as a victim of an unfair or deceptive practice
at the hands of not just the initial collector (which seems obvious) but
also the LLC and artist. The best argument is perhaps that given the
usual way in which property is transferred and property interests are
divided, this unusual use of an LLC operates as a deceptive device
deployed against those who later have dealings with the collector.
Because the collector possesses the art-the argument runs-anyone
dealing with him will assume he owns it, and the Art LLC is a
15 9. Id.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012); see Prentiss Cox et al., Strategies of Public UDAP
Enforcement, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 37, 41-47, 44 n.35 (2018) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1))
(describing range of laws and scope of enforcement).
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conscious and intentional attempt, on the part of the artist, to undermine
the laws (of a numerus clausus-type) that protect those longstanding
and well-grounded expectations.
This argument has some force. But for reasons already surveyed,
it might be difficult to support. As mentioned, even under
"longstanding" restrictions on the division of property rights, an object
in a personal art collection might not be owned outright by that
individual. It might be loaned or borrowed. It might be subject to a
security interest in favor of a creditor. Or, as in a well-known New York
case, art in the possession of a collector already might have been
"given" to his son with the reservation of a "life estate" in favor of the
father, who wishes to continue to enjoy the painting.' 6 ' It seems
strained, therefore, to argue that merely permitting the collector to have
possession of the work is furthering a deception, without more.
Additionally, rather than intending to deceive a third party, the
artist can credibly argue that she has no other readily available legal
means of protecting her agreed-upon, retained rights; to ascribe her
participation in this arrangement as a deceptive contrivance seems
uncharitable given the legitimate, nondeceptive purposes the
arrangement serves. Of course, the artist will also point to her lack of
participation in the deception (indeed, to her having been harmed in the
deception), assuming there are no facts suggesting actual complicity.
Again, particular factual circumstances, such as whether notice was
attached to the art (even if later removed), and whether the artist
pursued her rights promptly, might be relevant to the claim. But without
additional damning facts of some sort, the Art LLC as described seems
likely to survive such challenges.
Based on the foregoing, it seems unlikely that in the main run of
cases, the Art LLC will be thwarted by claims arising in fraud, under
alter-ego theories, or through consumer protection laws. Most likely, if
the initial collector "sells" the art without authorization, the artist will
be able to recover the art from the defrauded, would-be new collector.
It is worth noting that if the art is recovered, the new collector
likely would be entitled to equitable remedies, such as a claim for unjust
enrichment, against the artist. In other words, the result is not likely to
be a pure windfall for the artist. Practically, the new collector likely
would be entitled to step into the shoes of the original collector, perhaps
after paying the artist whatever resale royalties she should have been

161.

Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 871 (N.Y. 1986).
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paid in the first place. Such an "equitable" outcome might not be
welcome to the defrauded collector, who thought she already paid full
price and anticipated full ownership of the art, but it would certainly be
better than if the collector ended up losing both the putative purchase
price and the art.
4.

Financial Distress

The idealized Art LLC configuration assumes that the art remains
valuable and both parties can abide by their responsibilities under the
contract, financially. But that might not always hold true. Other bodies
of law would be implicated in sorting out which obligations continue
after distress is encountered.
Bankruptcy law is the main consideration. Like securities law,
federal bankruptcy law preempts inconsistent state law, including state
business entity law. Where bankruptcy law so dictates, the rights and
responsibilities of LLC members as expressed in an operating
agreement and other documents can be adjusted by the bankruptcy
court.' 62 The LLC structure likely would provide some additional
protection for the parties to the deal as compared with the risks under
the original Artist's Contract, although it also presents some potential
complications. This subpart briefly analyzes likely outcomes in
bankruptcy under the original Artist's Contract and under the Art LLC
regime.
Under the original Artist's Contract, the artist would bear
significant risks if the collector were to file bankruptcy. If the art
remained valuable, the trustee would try to sell the art "free and clear"
of the Artist's Contract restrictions.1 63 Because, as noted, current law
does not usually recognize property-type interests in personal property,
the artist's ongoing interest might lead only to a claim for damages, to
be paid along with other general unsecured claims.'" The trustee's
162. For instance, under some circumstances, federal bankruptcy law may prohibit a
provision in an operating agreement, or even in a business entity statute, that purports to
dissolve an LLC upon a member's bankruptcy filing. See Sheehan v. Warner (In re Warner),

480 B.R. 641, 656 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2012) (operating agreement provision); Duncan v.
Dixie Mgmt. & Inv., Ltd. Partners (In re Dixie Mgmt. & Inv., Ltd. Partners), 474 B.R. 698,701
(Bankr. WD. Ark. 2011) (state statutory provision).

163. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f) (2018).
164. Id. § 363(f)(1), (5). If the court believes the artist would likely have the ability to
specifically enforce the particular contract terms under state law, then such rights might be
considered encumbrances that remain with the property unless, in essence, they are either
complied with or paid in full. The exhibition rights and so on might survive; the resale royalty

right looks like a fairly straightforward right to payment (or even an unperfected security
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effort to sell the property free of restriction might well succeed. In any
case, there is a serious risk that upon the bankruptcy of the collector, an
artist might lose any further rights to or control of the art, with precious
little compensation.
The filing of bankruptcy by the artist would provoke less concern.
Again, it would be the bankruptcy trustee's responsibility to monetize
the assets of the artist including rights retained under the Artist's
Contract. The contract states the artist's rights are not assignable (aside
from rights to copy or reproduce the art, to which the artist is already
entitled under copyright law). This anti-assignment clause is likely to
be honored, at least as to the provisions of the contract that involve the
artist's personal approval of exhibitions and so on; the collector will
thus be protected from a rogue buyer seeking to extort the collector by
wielding those contract rights. The anti-assignment clause is less likely
to be honored as to resale royalties, which are merely rights to payment.
But the right to royalties being sold by the trustee and assigned to a
third party matters little; it merely changes the recipient of any royalty
check that the collector must write.1 6 5 The artist likely would not be
relieved of the obligation to provide authentication of the work,
although the outcome would depend on the court's analysis of the
situation on state law equitable principles.1 6 6 If the collector makes a
claim for damages as a result of the breach of such obligation, the claim
would be paid only in "bankruptcy dollars." But aside from this one
relatively minor potential harm, the collector's rights are unlikely to be
significantly impacted by such a bankruptcy.
The entity approach probably provides better outcomes in the case
of financial distress. If the Art LLC is used instead of the original
Artist's Contract, the potential effects of bankruptcy, particularly as to
the artist, are somewhat mitigated.

interest) and might therefore be more easily extinguishable in bankruptcy. Particularly in light
of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology LLC,
which emphasizes the importance of state law in assessing parties' rights and responsibilities
in bankruptcy, the issue will turn on state law. No. 17-1657, slip op. at 1 (May 20, 2019). In a
somewhat analogous context of attempted rejection of an executory contract, courts have
permitted, for instance, a nondebtor lessor to receive back a liquor license after the debtor
lessee's rejection-a decision that seems well supported now by Tempnology. Id.; Abboud v.
The Ground Round, Inc. (In re The Ground Round, Inc.), 482 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007).
165. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (permitting executory contract or unexpired lease
assignment).

166. See, e.g., Top Rank, Inc. v. Ortiz (In re Ortiz), 400 B.R. 755, 765-66 (C.D. Cal.
2009) (noting that equitable remedies may survive rejection based on state law).
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If either the artist or the collector filed for bankruptcy, the rights
of the bankrupt party under the LLC operating agreement would
become property of the bankruptcy estate, in the hands of the trustee.167
The most concerning outcome for either party would be the trustee
seeking to sell and assign the rights in the agreement to a third party.
The artist's filing likely would cause little concern along these
lines. As mentioned, the anti-assignment clauses giving the artist alone
the right to veto exhibitions and so on would likely be honored in
bankruptcy, meaning that only the artist could exercise such rights,
leaving the collector unmoved. Only the financial rights are likely to be
monetized in order to put money into the bankruptcy estate; as
mentioned, this is a matter of little concern to the collector-all she
might have to do is send the royalty check to a different addressee.
Therefore, the collector is unlikely to be particularly prejudiced by this
outcome.
If the collector files for bankruptcy, fewer concerns arise under
the Art LLC scheme than under the original Artist's Contract. The
collector's Art LLC membership interest includes both rights (daily
control of the artwork, etc.) and responsibilities (make resale royalty
payments, consult the artist about exhibitions, etc.). The bankruptcy
trustee cannot monetize the Art LLC membership interest-i.e., sell
it-without leaving these existing rights and responsibilities intact.
Thus, the LLC is likely to continue to protect the artist in the case of
the investor's bankruptcy. If the membership interest is not worth
anything given the terms of the agreement and the value of the art, then
the trustee will seek to abandon the membership interests ("reject" the
contract, in bankruptcy terms). The likely result would be the artist
receiving the art back. A reasonable operating agreement provision
would be that if the interests have no value or are abandoned in
bankruptcy, the artist obtains the artwork in fee simple and dissolves

167. The discussion above assumes the operating agreement would be considered
"executory," which seems the most likely outcome under governing law. Whether an LLC
operating agreement is an executory contract would have to be determined in particular cases.
As Professor Heminway has pointed out, it is not clear that in every case that a contract analysis
makes sense in the context of an operating agreement. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Ties
That Bind: LLC OperatingAgreements as Binding Commitments, 68 SMU L. REv. 811, 812
(2015) ("If an operating agreement is not a contract, LLC constituents may not be able to
successfully make arguments grounded in contract law in seeking judicial interpretation or
enforcement of an operating agreement."). Nonetheless, bankruptcy courts typically address
operating agreements using an executory contract analysis.
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the LLC.'68 If she or her estate does not wish to have the artwork, it
could be donated or destroyed.
There is also the possibility, although unlikely, that the LLC itself
could file for bankruptcy.' 6 9 This might happen, for instance, if the art
has little value and is expensive to maintain. This could present
complicated issues, but a well-drafted LLC agreement could probably
protect both the artist's and collector's interests in most respects in such
a situation. For instance, a well-drafted operating agreement could
include an auction mechanism to determine whether the collector
should buy out the uneconomical maintenance obligations by a lumpsum payment to the artist or the artist buy out the residual value of the
work from the collector.
These are the most important bankruptcy issues that might arise
in the course of an Art LLC's life. With respect to each of these issues,
the proposed Art LLC provides advantages over the original Artist's
Contract in that it more simply preserves the outcomes that would be
desired, and expected, by the parties to the transaction, without injuring
third parties.
5.

Secrecy, Disclosure, and Regulation

The boundaries of current business law also affect the use of Art
LLCs with respect to secrecy and disclosure. As with the prior subparts,
so here, too, their governing law provides some limits, on the one hand,
but also remains subject to controversy, as some argue that it does not
provide enough protection against abuse.
The Art LLC's operating agreement likely would entitle the artist
to information about the location of the art and the current possessors
of it, as did the original Artist's Contract.170 Even this minimal
requirement might represent a significant shifting of norms in the
"notoriously opaque" art market and offend art world sensibilities more
than an outsider to that world might expect."' Nevertheless, users of
168. 11 U.S.C. § 554.
169. An operating agreement can set up hurdles against such a filing but cannot outright
restrict a filing. Unanimous consent, for instance, although the artist might prefer it, might be
too high a requirement.
170. Formally speaking, the agreement would probably provide that all members of the
LLC should be kept apprised of the location of the art and should be kept abreast of the
membership of the LLC. Thus, if John dies and Nelson inherits his membership interest, the
artist would be so informed.
171. Brian L. Frye, New A rtfor the People:Art Funds& FinancialTechnology, 93 CHI.KENT L. REV. 113, 113 (2018).
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the original Artist's Contract would have faced the same problem, and
the parties to the deal could of course make more restrictive
agreements, as they wish, concerning information about the persons
involved. The more difficult issue is the degree to which access to
information about Art LLCs should be publicly available to others
outside the deal, and whether business law provides an appropriate
balance of disclosure and confidentiality.
The Art LLC would face very low disclosure requirements under
current law, as discussed above.172 Regulators, and the public at large,
would have little to no information about the parties transacting in the
art owned by the Art LLC, or the agreements they have made, thanks
to Delaware's highly secretive disclosure rules (and despite the fact that
it is a state-registered and state-regulated business entity). That said, the
mere fact of having the art "owned" by an entity subject to public
registration and potential regulatory oversight might be resisted by
some art collectors; even the limited disclosure of the LLC's name and
the possibility of discovery of the LLC's membership-albeit through
several layers of secrecy-might be considered too much of a risk for
some.
There are several overlapping reasons for the hyper-secretive
status quo in the art market, particularly in its upper reaches. One is that
art can be a useful asset in money laundering and tax evasion. 173 Often,
art is easy to transport yet difficult for authorities to track. In addition,
its value can be manipulated depending on the tax avoidance or other
financial "needs" of a collector.

172. See supranotes 92-98 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Graham Bowley & William K. Rashbaum, Has the Art Market Become
an UnwittingPartnerin Crime?, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
02/19/arts/design/has-the-art-market-become-an-unwitting-partner-in-crime.html
("Artworks
are particularly suitable vehicles for money launderers, experts said, because they transfer
easily and store quietly, perhaps in a basement or in an offshore tax haven.... [And] values in
art can be suddenly boosted by intangibles such as fads and personal taste."); Financial
Integrity Institute Co-Hosts "The Art Market and Money Laundering:A Symposium" in NYC,
CASE WESTERN REs. U. ScH. L. (Oct. 28, 2018), https://case.edu/law/our-school/news/financialintegrity-institute-co-hosts-art-market-and-money-laundering-symposium-nyc ("Dirty money,
disguised as capital gains on the sale of sale of [sic] one or more assets, is laundered by
undervaluing art at purchase or overvaluing it at sale, making it difficult for financial
institutions or law enforcement to find out. Transferring the value of the criminal proceeds is
then implemented by simply transferring ownership of the asset."). As the Artist's Contract's
progenitor, Siegelaub, commented in an interview: "Buying and selling art has always been

and still is a very private business. There is a lot of money in collections and many people
invest their money in art, for example, for tax reasons." EICHHoRN, supra note 13, at 42.
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Anonymity also provides security. Expensive artworks are easy to
transport, but also to steal and may attract unwanted attention to wealth.
While ostentatious consumption of art has, for millennia, been a habit
of the well-to-do, the well-to-do often want to be selective about the
audiences of their ostentation. This concern is especially prevalent
among the extremely wealthy who in recent decades have dominated
much of the art market.
Of course, many art collectors are neither wildly wealthy nor
possessed of ill intent; they simply want to own art, for enjoyment or
speculation or both. But the concerns of the unsavory and the moneyed
appear to have led to the development of art market norms that include
thorough confidentiality. While the Art LLC preserves a remarkable
amount of secrecy, it may not satisfy the desires of art collectors for
secrecy.
Collectors might seek to add additional layers of business entities
as protection and/or write more protections for their identity into the
operating agreement. Perhaps an artist would agree to an operating
agreement that would be sufficiently limited in disclosure obligations,
or high in confidentiality requirements, so as to please collectors; one
could imagine an artist agreeing to a nondisclosure agreement with a
significant liquidated damages clause, or to making the nominal
"member of the LLC" an attorney or other intermediary to further
74
protect the identity of the actual party in interest.' There would remain
a risk that the collector's identity and actions could be tracked and
discovered. While business law interposes numerous layers of secrecy,
determined regulators have the tools to pierce them. Particularly if
illicit activities are under consideration, the use of the Art LLC might
bring risks, to the collector-buyer and possibly to the artist-seller.
Ironically, it is conceivable that willingness of a collector to agree to
use the Art LLC might actually become an indicator that the collector
is transacting above-board. From this perspective, regulators such as
taxing authorities might benefit from widespread use of Art LLCs as
compared with the Artist's Contract (or most other art transactions).
None of this is to suggest that the Art LLC would provide an ideal
degree of secrecy. There are powerful arguments that modem business
law makes secrecy too easy to maintain, erecting barriers against even
174. Of course, even if the operating agreement includes strict confidentiality
requirements and liquidated damages, etc., for breaches, the enforcement of such clauses can
itself cause unpleasant and public disclosures, even if the disagreements are subject to
arbitration. Artists also may or may not be judgment proof.
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legitimate investigations, for instance, those of taxing authorities. But
from a regulatory perspective, routing art transactions through Art
LLCs might be an improvement over the status quo and could
ultimately be a basis for reining in some of the worst abuses of the art
market. For the same reason, practically speaking, the desire for
secrecy might be the biggest barrier to using the Art LLC. Thus,
regulators might be expected to support the proposed use of business
entities such as Art LLCs, and such uses might be worth incentivizing
further, if they might serve other social goals such as increasing tax
compliance.
Other bodies of law could of course mitigate the effectiveness and
desirability of the proposed Art LLC arrangement, but these issues
seem to be ones that would be most pressing and that help to delineate
the limits of what the business entity structure can and cannot do.'7 Of
course, this is but one case study. Modem business entity law has
become increasingly flexible and can be fitted to all sorts of purposes.
Different uses of business entities may face different potential
impediments, which will have to be addressed creatively-whether by
business lawyers seeking to deploy them or by courts and policy
makers seeking to assess their normative value and restrain them as
needed. But it seems likely that it will be from these different areas of
law that regulation of the using of transactional business entities must
be drawn, and not from state business law. And as seen in the preceding
discussion, these limits are already meaningful and could be further
tailored as uses of entities continue to evolve.
The next Part compares the business entity approach to the
problem of the Artist's Contract with other approaches, some that could
be implemented by parties structuring their relationships differently,
some that lawmakers could choose to impose.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE ART LLC

This Part of the Article outlines alternative legal approaches to
permit parties to accomplish similar goals to those attained by the Art
LLC. First, it lays out alternative approaches to the Art LLC problem
under existing law. Some of the benefits of the Art LLC could be
175. There are, of course, other potential limits on the scheme, such as the cross-border
enforceability of the arrangement, as well as domestic and cross-border tax issues, that could
arise. At a minimum, these challenges seem likely not to be worsenedbythe LLC arrangement
as compared with the simple contract, and they are not discussed here as a matter of practicality.
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obtained by other legal tools-including trusts, leases, bailments, and
security interests-and each offers some advantages and some
disadvantages as compared with a business entity approach. Second, it
sketches out new legal regimes that lawmakers could put in place to
enable artists and collectors to divide property rights as imagined in the
Artist's Contract. Lawmakers could provide for reservation of rights
agreements, for instance, by passing laws ordering that reservations of
rights clearly noted on works of art would be legally binding, and/or by
awarding more expansive moral rights and resale royalty rights to
artists, and/or by creating a central registry where potential buyers
could investigate claims on particular artworks. Taken together, these
alternative regimes help illustrate the virtues and vices of using
business entities to sculpt property rights and give an idea of the
tradeoffs presented by different legal approaches to facilitating
commercial transactions.
A.

Alternatives Under CurrentLaw

1.

Informal Tools

One approach would be to rely less on law and more on social
organization. 176 Lawyers tend to overestimate the need for law to
handle social problems. Thus, one plausible solution to the Artist's
Contract's enforceability problem might be to rely on social pressure
and collective action. Much as Siegelaub and his collaborators sought
to spark the development of new social norms, artists today could band
together and seek agreement on new norms. They could seek to obtain
the agreement of key collectors and dealers that they would not transact
in art in violation of existing agreements and would not sell except to
parties who agreed to any existing conditions imposed by an Artist's
Contract-like agreement with respect to a given work of art. 7 The
success of such a plan would depend largely on whether "cheating" on
the agreed-upon norms could be detected and sanctioned, which might
depend in turn on the size and cohesiveness of the community.
176. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WiTHouT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 10 (1991) (exploring informally developed conflict resolution methods).

177. Although the emphasis is on the contractual side of the agreement, my suggestion
aligns with one of Hansmann and Kraakman's proposed approaches: "An artist-or a group of
artists or an artists' association-might . . obtain contractual commitments from galleries and
auction houses that deal in their work not to broker resales of the work in which the purchaser
does not make the requisite contractual commitment to the artist." Hansmann & Kraakman,
Property, Contract, and Verification, supra note 57, at S389.
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Although it stretches around the globe, much of the power in the art
world remains concentrated in a relatively small group of major artists,
collectors, tastemakers, and dealers. Therefore, it is conceivable this
sort of arrangement could work. On the other hand, given the profound
privacy norms that govern most art sales, as well as the shadowy
brokerage and storage arrangements that seem to pervade certain
corners of the art market, violations might be difficult to detect and/or
punish. If the "new norms" were to come to be seen as illegitimate due
to a lack of enforceability (even if informal), their effectiveness would
decline.
A helpful adjunct to these new norms would be a public art
registry, where artworks could be indexed and restrictions recorded.
Scholars have suggested, and some companies are pursuing, forms of
registration of art works that could provide the basis for such a system,
including by use of novel technologies."' While proposals for a
government-administered system are discussed below, a private system
might be more nimble and responsive than a state-run system and
might more easily obtain the buy-in of the art market.17 9 Such a system
doesn't solve enforceability difficulties on its own, but it would support
the new norms by making reliable information about restrictions easy
to obtain.
2.

Trusts, Statutory Trusts, and Other Business Forms

There are numerous forms of corporate entities that could serve in
place of an LLC. Common-law trusts are most obvious. For centuries,
and still in many instances today, trusts were and are the primary
vehicle for dividing property interests, including the separation of
present possessory rights from future or other contingent rights.'
178. See Hansmann & Santilli, Authors'andArtists',supranote 40, at 120 (noting that
the development of an industry-wide system for art, including registration and notice system,
could be successful); Whitaker, Artist as Owner, supra note 43, at 56-59. Professor Whitaker
notes that such a registration system, in addition to clarifying property rights, bears other
information-related benefits: "Over time, the system protects artists' exposure to the upside that
their own work creates, while also building a catalogue raisonn6 and an investment portfolio
for the artist and collector alike." Whitaker, Artist as Owner, supra at 59. Professor Whitaker
points among other things to the platform of Xipsy. Xipsy, http://www.xipsy.com/ (last visited
Dec. 5, 2019); Whitaker, Artist as Owner supranote 43, at 53, 56-68.
179. See infra Part IV.B.
180.
The reality is that virtually anyone who wants to create complicated future interests
in personal property, including of course stocks, bonds, and shares in mutual fundsthe largest source of wealth in today's society-does so through a trust. The trustee
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Particularly in the days before business law as such took its modem
turn toward leniency and flexibility, trust law was where "creative"
business, commercial, and financing lawyers looked for their tools. The
paradigmatic early example of a complex business enterprise,
Rockefeller's Standard Oil, involved the extensive use of trusts (one of
the reasons our anti-monopoly laws are referred to as "antitrust"
laws).' 8
The artist and collector could serve as the co-trustees, and the
beneficiaries, of the trust, which would own the painting. The trust
could be formed by agreement with no need for public filing of any
82
documents, and with no registration expenses or annual fees.' The
trust instrument could specify the parties' various rights and
responsibilities, along the lines of what has been described for the Art
LLC. Such an agreement might well be honored by many state courts.
That said, this type of use of a trust is unusual and might evoke
suspicion or hostility from some courts, who might well believe an
LLC or other registered corporate entity is more appropriate for this
type of arrangement (essentially a type of joint venture of two arm'slength commercial actors).' There is some increased risk of breachof-duty disputes with the common-law trust by contrast with LLC
statutes that more clearly permit the disavowal of all duties (aside from
the minimal implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair
dealing). Because of the total secrecy of common-law trusts, courts
may be more reluctant to honor the "corporate fiction" with respect to
the crucial issue of ownership of the art, if, for instance, as posited
above, the collector illicitly were to try to pass title in violation of the
holds title to the personal property in fee simple, and the beneficiaries hold life
estates and remainders, or sometimes more unusual interests, described using the
building blocks of the common-law estates in land. In effect, the trust combines a

highly simplified title in the underlying assets with a significant degree of flexibility
in designating the beneficial uses of those assets.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 66, at 18 (internal footnote omitted) (collecting sources); John
Morley, The Common Law Corporation:The Power ofthe Trust in Anglo-American Business
History, 116 COLUM. L.REv. 2145, 2146 (2016).
181. See, e.g., Reyes, supra note 104, at 373, 375-77 (stating the history and rationale
behind the development of the Standard Oil Trust).
182. 1 leave aside, as I did above, the tax consequences of the initial sale, and any later
sale, which might well require disclosure of some aspects of the transaction to taxing
authorities. It is of course possible that there would be ongoing tax issues, particularly if the art
were to generate income. In the common case where no such income was generated, there
would not likely be any federal tax consequences until the time of sale.
183. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as "Uncorporation": A Research Agenda, 2005

U. ILL. L. REv. 31, 33 (2005) ("[P]roblems of limited liability and spotty judicial recognition
...

have cast a pall over the use of the common-law business trust.").
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agreement. Finally, if a dispute were to end up in a state court aside
from where the trust was settled, a court might not apply the law of the
state of settlement as to all matters, so it might be harder to predict
outcomes with the common-law trust approach as opposed to the LLC
approach, where the "internal affairs" doctrine would provide reliable
protection.18 4 The upshot is that there would probably be significantly
more risk with a common-law trust as compared with an LLC. The
secrecy gains might make this approach worth it to some market
participants. The loss of reliability seems likely to rule it out for others.
A "statutory" or "business" trust might be a likely alternative
candidate. Under some state laws, it could be structured to work very
similarly to the LLC discussed above. The (minimal) administrative
costs are similar to those of an LLC; most trust laws require (minimal)
disclosures similar to those of an LLC.' The statutory trust (or
statutory business trust) has been described as "the final step in the
historical evolution of commercial entities" because it "effectively
represents the minimum required of law in creating a strong entity ...
and leaves the rest to be determined by contract."l8 6 Statutory trusts are
used extensively in some industries; many mutual funds commonly
take the form of statutory trusts, as do special purpose vehicles and
other entities used in securitization transactions.1 8 7
That said, as compared with the LLC, statutory trusts remain
unfamiliar to most practitioners and judges (not to say to academics,
even those who specialize in business law or trusts and estates law)."
184. This risk has diminished somewhat due to the increasing adoption of the Uniform
Trust Code (UTC). However, even in UTC states there may be nonuniform application of the
law to a rather unusual nature of the proposed use of a trust.
185. See Reyes, supra note 104, at 410 nn.216-18 and accompanying text (collecting
and describing state laws).
186. Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1335, 1397
(2006) (footnote omitted). Like the LLC Act, the text of the Statutory Trust Act makes its
allegiance clear: "It is the policy of this subchapter to give maximum effect to the principle of
freedom of contract and to the enforceability of governing instruments." DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 3825(b) (2019).
187. As for common uses of such trusts, see, for example, Thomas E. Rutledge & Ellisa
0. Habbart, The Unform Statutory Trust Entity Act: A Review, 65 Bus. LAw. 1055, 1057
(2010) ("[T]he business trust has come to be utilized for asset securitization and the
organization of real estate investment trusts.").
188. Sitkoff, supra note 183, at 34 ("[T]he business trust is something of an orphan in
the domestic legal academy."). More than twenty years ago, Professor Langbein also noted that
although it is not reflected in the work of legal academics teaching and researching in this area,
"most of the wealth that is held in trust in the United States is placed there incident to business
deals." John H. Langbein, Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce,
107 YALE L.J. 165, 166 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
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Only 1762 statutory trusts were formed in Delaware in 2018, as
compared with 157,142 LLCs and 44,669 corporations. 8 9 The more
familiar tool of the LLC seems sufficiently fit for the task, and the
statutory trust offers few advantages over it.' 90 Thus, while a statutory
trust is a perfectly plausible tool, the LLC is probably the form most
likely to be adopted for this purpose by a critical mass of artists and
their legal advisors.
That said, even if the LLC is the most likely business entity, there
is ample room for creativity in how it is structured; the Art LLC
proposal here is only one possible approach. Consider this: Rather than
a new LLC for each artwork, at the beginning of her career, the artist
could create one LLC to hold all of her art. The single operating
agreement for this LLC could specify that, if she chooses, she can add
each new creation to the LLC and then sell membership interests to
collectors giving them possession (and the other associated rights) with
respect to (only) the piece of art they "buy." Each collector could sell
the membership interest with rights in that particular object as they
wished (after paying royalties and complying with the other agreedupon requirements), but no more. This approach, like the primary
approach I have outlined, would bear some advantages and some
disadvantages.' 9 ' In any case, though, it illustrates that there is room for
different structures to be tried.
3.

Security Interests

The obligations imposed in the Artist's Contract could be
structured as a security interest under Article 9 of the Uniform

189. Annual Report Statistics,supranote 1. Informal conversations suggest that a major
reason for reluctance is lack of experience with the act, among practitioners and courts.
Practitioners may have concerns that they will accidentally trip up or that a court will go astray
in the absence of case law and bodies of practice experience in the broad business law
community. See generally Rutledge & Habbart, supra note 187 (discussing the Uniform
Statutory Trust Act and identifying some areas of concern and ambiguity).
190. This illustrates a potential snowball effect: As comfort with business entities grows
among lawyers and others, use will grow-which may in turn induce more comfort. This cycle
may continue until a major "shock" is encountered.
191. This proposal could provide an interesting mechanism for addressing another issue
raised by Hansmann and Santilli: They suggest that the artist's credible commitment not to
waive the moral right to integrity in another artwork at a future time might raise prices for the
artist's work. See Hansmann & Santilli, Authors'andArtists',supra note 40, at 128. Such a
commitment might rather easily be made in the arrangement imagined in the text above; any
collector could assert the "right of integrity" against any other fellow members of the LLC
seeking to degrade another work by the artist owned by the LLC. Id.
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Commercial Code.1 9 2 Under this structure, the artwork would be sold
to the collector, but the artist would retain a security interest in it. The
rights retained by the artist would be encumbrances that remain in place
until the art is sold under the required conditions and then would be
reimposed each time as obligations of each new buyer of the art.' 93
Usually, the obligations secured by the security interest would persist
on a given piece of collateral (the artwork) as well as the proceeds of
its sale,1 94 which could help the artist ensure successful collection of
resale royalties and obedience to the other requirements of the
contract.' 95 Security interests are established by simple agreement and
perfection of them requires only a filing in the state of the debtor'shere the collector's-residence. 9 6 A simple and inexpensive filing
every five years would maintain the security interest under most
circumstances. 97 Many lawyers (and courts) remain familiar with
Article 9 and could help keep costs of this arrangement relatively low.
Security interests do not usually include such a wide variety of
conditions and restrictions without a primary payment obligation, but
there does not appear to be any hindrance to this type of condition
forming the basis of a security interest under Article 9.'98
Nevertheless, even if Article 9 permits the creation of a security
interest to secure any sort of obligation-including nonmonetary ones
such as those included in the Artist's Contract-the remedy for default
under Article 9 is not entirely obvious. While Article 9 may be
permissive in terms of obligations that can be secured, it doesn't have
192. The basics of security interests, and their many analogies to a shared ownership
arrangement (analogous to the Art LLC), are discussed by Danielle D'Onfro, LimitedLiability
Property, 39 CARDOZO L. REv. 1365, 1375-91 (2018).
193. See Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite?, supra note 39, at 74 n.108.
194. U.C.C. §§ 9-315, 9-507 (AM. LAWINST. &UNIF. LAWCOMM'N 2017).
195. Of course, under the Artist's Contract, the artist owes obligations too, such as
verifying the art upon the request of the collector. These obligations could either be left as
merely contractual obligations, or they could be incorporated into the security agreement, such
that the violation of those obligations would in turn oblige the artist to release her security
interest in the artwork.
196. U.C.C. §§ 9-307(e), 9-310(a).
197. Id. § 9-515; UCC Filing& ExpeditedFees, DELAWARE.Gov, https://corp.delaware.
gov/uccfeesSept09/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2019).
198. See, e.g., John F. Duffy & Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial
Law ofIntellectualProperty, 102 VA. L. REv. 1, 60-61 (2016) (citing, inter alia, U.C.C. §§ 1201(b)(35), 9-102(a)(59), 9-204 cmt. 5, all of which indicate performance of obligations aside
from mere monetary payment can serve as the bases for security interests) ("Although security
interests are usually employed to secure an obligation to repay a debt, they can secure
performance of a much broader class of obligations. The text of the UCC makes this abundantly
clear.").
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that capacious an idea of remedies. The remedy for default under
Article 9 is to foreclose and sell collateral that is encumbered by the
security interest to fulfill the obligation. Then, if the sale yields more
than is owed, the "creditor" pays the surplus to the "debtor" (Article 9's
terminology for the collector in the art scenario).199 There is no obvious
way to incorporate nonmonetary remedies. One could try to meet this
challenge by including liquidated damages clauses for each type of
violation, but this is at best an awkward solution, and perhaps an
incomplete or unenforceable one.2 00 Many of the Artist's Contract
obligations seem difficult to put any reasonable price on. State laws
vary considerably in the degree to which they enforce liquidated
damages clauses.2 0' Perhaps Article 9's notion of remedies should
match the breadth of its notion of obligations that can be secured, but
the current law leaves some uncertainty.
Another concern is that security interests might not protect against
even simple contrivances intended to undermine the Artist's Contract
obligations. For instance, if the collector were to change states of
residence, the artist would have only a limited time to detect that
change and file a new financing statement to maintain her secured
status with respect to the art.202 If the collector were to transfer the
artwork to someone in another state, the artist would have only a year
to detect the transfer and file a new financing statement before losing
her secured status.2 03 These are only the most common worries, but
there are other traps for the unwary that might cause artists to lose out
under the rules of Article 9.204 Article 9, in fact, requires considerable
effort at monitoring for security interests to remain, so to speak, secure.
As mentioned above, however, the fact is that any approach to the
Artist's Contract remains imperfect without significant effort at
199. See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-601, 9-608, 9-609, 9-610, 9-615, 9-616 (referring to
multiple situations in which a creditor has rights over a debtor).
200. This is how Duffy and Hynes suggest solving the analogous problem with respect
to their suggested use of Article 9 to secure intellectual property-related nonmonetary
obligations. Duffy & Hynes, supra note 198, at 61 n.244.
201.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 356

(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (noting that

liquidated damages must be fixed in an "amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated
or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss").
202. See U.C.C. § 9-316.
203. See id. § 9-316(a)(3).
204. For instance, certain forms of exchange can cause a security interest to be stripped
from collateral. See, e.g., id. § 9-315(d)(3) ("A perfected security interest in proceeds becomes
unperfected on the 21st day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds unless ... the
security interest in the proceeds is perfected ... when the security interest attaches to the
proceeds or within 20 days thereafter.").
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monitoring, so Article 9 might not be much worse than the Art LLC,
practically speaking.
Despite the need for vigilance, and despite the somewhat unusual
fit of the Artist's Contract obligations to the remedies provided in
Article 9, it remains a realistic alternative for maintaining the artist's
interests in the piece after the initial sale.
4.

Bailments and Leases

A bailment is when an item of property is entrusted to another
with ownership remaining with the bailor even though the bailee has
most of the traditional indicia of ownership, most notably possession.2 05
The contract between bailor (artist) and bailee (collector) could specify
the terms of the bailment, which could largely follow the terms of the
Artist's Contract. Treating an art sale as a bailment would allow the
artist to retain the ultimate right to possession of the art should the
parties' agreement not be honored. Thus, as with the Art LLC, the artist
would argue that an attempted transfer by the bailee to a new party
would be invalid because the bailee couldn't pass on any better title
than he had in the first place.
The troubling aspect of this approach, however, is that bailments
are judged not on form, but on substance.206 Courts look to whether the
actual transaction most resembles a bailment, a sale, or a
consignment.2 0 7 Such determinations are often difficult to make and
subject the parties involved to considerable risk.20 8 The Artist's
Contract arguably describes a situation more like a sale than a bailment;
aside from temporary display rights, there isn't any contemplation of
the art being returned ultimately to the artist.

205. "[A] bailment is an agreement, either express or implied, that one person will
entrust personal property to another for a specific purpose and that when the purpose is
accomplished the bailee will return the property to the bailor." Milbank Ins. Co. v. Ind. Ins.

Co., 56 N.E.3d 1222, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Pitman v. Pitman, 717 N.E.2d 627,
631 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). Bailments are governed by U.C.C. § 2-403(3).
206. Teneha Oil Co. v. Blount, 368 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (quoting In
re Wells, 140 F. 752, 752 (M.D. Pa. 1905)) ("The question is what was the inherent character
of the transaction, which depends upon the purpose of it.").

207. If the goods are deemed to have been entrusted "for sale," U.C.C.

§ 9-102(a)(20),

the bailment could be treated as a "consignment," which would then be governed by U.C.C.

sections 9-317(a), 9-324.
208. See, e.g., In re Sitkin Smelting & Refining, Inc., 639 E2d 1213, 1214, 1218 (5th
Cir. 1981) (finding, over a dissent, that the bankruptcy judge's initial decision should be
reversed on the issue of whether an entrustment of film for processing was a bailment).
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The contract could be modified to make it more like a bailment,
in effect allowing the collector to have the art in the form of a longterm loan. But this would change the economics of the transaction
considerably because the collector would presumably be missing much
more of the potential investment value of the art. The artist would have
to be prepared for the potential return of large numbers of works as they
reached the end of their rental periods, thus shifting much more of the
risk of the market back onto artists. Aside from certain narrow
situations, the bailment would probably be an inadequate approach to
the problem.
Structuring the transaction as a lease bears similar risks.20 9 The
theory of a lease would be that, as with a bailment, title to the art
remains with the artist and not the collector, and thus the collector could
not dispose of the art. But courts commonly reframe transactions
described by the parties as "leases" as actual sales, or sales with a
reservation of a security interest.2 10 These characterizations might well
be applied to a transaction between artist and collector. The
determination is based upon factors such as whether the length of the
"lease" is likely to consume all of the meaningful economic life of the
object and whether the lessee has an option to return the item without
paying further fees (or with a partial refund if the lease was prepaid).2 1
As with bailments, then, the lease would likely only be respected by
courts if the artist was willing to shoulder much more of the risk of the
transaction than contemplated in the Artist's Contract, effectively
renting instead of selling the art, and if the collector was willing to
forego much or all of the investment value of the art. Some artists and
some collectors may be willing to do so, but it would be a meaningful
shift.
The above discussion canvases some of the ways in which an
Artist's-Contract-like arrangement might be contrived under existing
law without using an Art LLC. In addition to current legal options, there
209. Hansmann and Santilli have pointed out that some aspects of an Artist's Contracttype relationship could be created by lease, although, as they note, there are potential practical
and legal impediments to this arrangement. See Hansmann & Santilli, Authors'andArtists',
supranote 40, at 120-21.
210. See U.C.C. § 1-203(a) ("Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a lease
or security interest is determined by the facts of each case."). In the latter case, as described in
the preceding subpart, the artist's rights could be protected, but only if the arrangement
complies with the requirements of Article 9.

211. See id.

§ 1-203(b).
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are also approaches to the problem that could be enacted by
policymakers. Those alternatives are the focus of the next subpart.
B.

PotentialLegal Reforms

Policymakers who wish to provide options for artists and
collectors could enact laws to do so. Several potential statutory
approaches illustrate the range of options for lawmakers. From a
normative perspective, these approaches provide a palette of options
from which policy makers could choose if they wish to provide, or
require, the use of tools other than business entity law by artists and
collectors seeking to customize their rights.
One approach would be to introduce stronger droit moral and
droit de suite; in other words, to put the rights contained in the Artist's
Contract into law, on a mandatory basis, on a default basis, or on an
"opt-in" basis.2 12 Laws protecting moral rights and resale royalty rights
typically specify the contents of the rights themselves. They also
provide for the degree to which the rights are mandatory or not; on one
extreme, rights can be inalienable and non-waivable, or, on the other,
be mere default rules, waivable or alienable at will. Where mandatory
and non-waivable by artists-as is the case in many countries-such
regimes have been subject to significant critique.2 13 Granting the rights
but allowing artists to control them seems like a better possibility; a
purely opt-in regime would be the one that would most resemble the
Artist's Contract itself.2 14 Even so, policymakers would need to
consider how easy or difficult to make the decision to waive rights.
There would likely be a loss of autonomy for the parties even in this
arrangement, since the rights themselves would come from a limited
"menu" of moral rights or resale royalty rights. In addition, there are
costs associated with the parties to transactions having to learn a
particular body of law, which may in some cases be more costly than
merely informing themselves about the details of an agreement they
draft or negotiate among themselves.
Lawmakers would need also to consider whether to establish
particular procedures by which the rights could be claimed or
212. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (on these rights).
214. Not that this approach is free from critique focusing on the overall market effects
of such restrictions, even when engaged in voluntarily. See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 45, at

262 (discussing the practical difficulties of a waivable form of droite de suite). I don't find
these critiques particularly convincing but leave this argument for another day.
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transferred. These procedures are largely implemented for the
protection of third parties. For instance, some jurisdictions have
established public administrative structures to register the covered
works and artists or to track sales and direct royalty payments. There is
a trade-off between the benefits associated with such procedures and
structures, such as enforceability, convenience, and provision of notice,
and their costs, including not only the direct costs of salaries and
infrastructure but also the ossification and lack of responsiveness or
effectiveness that can come to characterize established bureaucracies
over time. Though its costs shouldn't be underestimated, an
administrative structure could be effective in providing a relatively "off
the rack" way for rights to be claimed and maintained, protecting party
autonomy as well as third parties.
A second approach would be for lawmakers to provide (or courts
to hold) that agreements concerning divisions of property rights in art
will be honored. The law might also provide that subsequent collectors
must receive notice of the restrictions in order to be bound by them.
Under this approach, an agreed-upon encumbrance would run with the
work and bind future collectors so long as the subsequent collectors
received notice of the restrictions. Courts or legislature would have to
develop a workable definition of "adequate notice."2 15 Adequate notice
could potentially include constructive or inquiry notice. This approach
would require no dedicated infrastructure but might introduce ex post
expenses in the form of litigation contesting "adequacy." Adoption of
this approach might have been an implicit goal of the original Artist's
Contract; if artists had adopted it en masse as Seth Siegelaub hoped,
perhaps courts would have begun to find an opening for this type of
approach.
Conceivably, this second approach joins a registration system
akin to the U.C.C. The idea would be to institute a central registration
216
system, like the U.C.C. Article 9 system (and many others ), for artists
to provide notice of any restrictions they claim with respect to a given
work of art and for future collectors to know where to look for reliable
information concerning such restrictions. Artworks could be indexed
by the name of the artist and title or description. Even if the details of
the restrictions were not publicly disclosed, the system could put any
215. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite?, supra note 39, at 74-78, 132.
216. The most colorful example of a registry is clown egg registry in Wokey Hole,
England, which provides "a means of protecting clowns' property in their personae." David
Fagundes & Aaron Perzanowski, Clown Eggs, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2019).
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buyers on inquiry notice prior to transacting in the artwork. This
approach would require new infrastructure investments in the form of
a filing system and the development of law concerning the adequacy
of notice. This is not impossible; there are similar recording systems
for real property, airplane parts, and some forms of intellectual
property, so there are models on which to base a system. 217 The
efficiency of these existing systems has often been called into question,
but it is also possible that technology could help ease the introduction
of a new system.2 18
As these examples show, similar substantive results can be
attained through an array of tools including business entities. All
approaches involve trade-offs. These alternative approaches provide
essentially the same benefits as the Art LLC approach, but do not
require a detour through business entity law. They might provide more
uniform access to desired solutions at a lower cost to the individuals
involved in the transactions, although at a higher cost to the parties in
the form of loss of autonomy and to society in the form of bureaucratic
and legal infrastructure. The availability of these various tools calls for
policy analysis regarding which tools should be preferred and which
resisted.
An underlying question is whether the detour through business
entity law serves some sort of valuable purpose in itself. Perhaps, for
instance, there is a benefit in some of the process required by business
entity law. Perhaps these forms are actually useful for a wider range of
joint endeavors than was traditionally recognized. But in current
commercial and business scholarship, there remains a disconnect
between what is still considered the heartland of business entity law
and the uses of that law to accomplish purposes rather far afield. We
can't expect a conceptually pure understanding of when a relationship
or transaction is or isn't "inherently" one that merits creation of a
separate entity, but we can and should explore when parties should be
given (or forced into) various policy avenues, including the use of trusts
or business associations.
The main advantage of business entity law appears to be its
flexibility-the freedom and creativity that it grants to parties to a
217. See, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 63, at 907 ("There is no comprehensive
recording system for personal property, a shortcoming that may help to explain the uncertain
status of personal property servitudes.").
218. See, e.g., Whitaker, Artist as Owner, supranote 43, at 55-57 (discussing how the
blockchain system may streamline standalone marketplaces by making banking or financial
institutions unnecessary).
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transaction or relationship. On the other hand, in some cases there are
reasons to prefer dedicated statutory options such as those discussed
above, to both lower transaction costs and provide wider access without
requiring detours through business entity laws. Weighing the
advantages and disadvantages of these different approaches in various
legal contexts is a task that remains largely undone-but of utmost
importance.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that what the Artist's Contract on its own
couldn't accomplish, an Art LLC can. The parties to a transaction can
divide property rights in the artwork in a dependable and enduring
fashion by means of modem business law. Without minimizing the
administrative and financial costs of the arrangement, there is a strong
argument to be made that this solution to the problems of the original
Artist's Contract is feasible under current law. What is more, I suggest
that it may be defensible as a normative matter. First, allowing artists
to customize and select their desired slate of "artist's rights" through
privately organized entities might make more sense than imposing
rights by legislative flat or administering them through central
bureaucracy. Second, as thinkers before and after the Artist's Contract
have pointed out, the sale of the art of a living artist is rarely a true "oneoff' transaction. What is bought remains connected to the seller; the
future activities of both buyer and seller affect the value of the art that
is sold as well as of the other works created by the artist. While the
relationship between buyer and seller looks nothing like a traditional
corporation or a common-law partnership, modem business law gives
the parties a way of expressing their ongoing relationship to a particular
piece of property-their mutual expectations, their agreed-upon rights
and responsibilities-by embodying the agreement in a business entity.
While the Art LLC little resembles a traditional business enterprise, its
use makes considerable sense. Likely, similar justifications could be
offered for many other "creative" uses of business forms. Regulating
novel uses away simply because of their unfamiliarity would be a
mistake.
That said, business-driven creativity can and should have its
limits. Shrouding an asset or transaction in an entity should not (and
does not currently) remove it from the field of regulation. As this
Article has shown, there are, and should be, limits to how business
entities can be used; numerous bodies of law impact and circumscribe
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the powers and uses of Art LLCs and similar "transactional entities."
But they do not adequately address the policy trade-offs raised by the
increasingly pervasive use of business entities as commercial and
transactional tools. Lawmakers should not hesitate to take on the
important task of weighing the normative goals driving other areas of
law and regulation against the interests of parties deploying business
entities in their commercial relationships.
Thus, this Article is not the end of a conversation. The Art LLC is
one discrete use of business entities for everyday commerce, but it is
not the only one. Sculpting property rights by private agreement is one
task that can be accomplished by the use of skillfully constructed
business entities, but it is not the only one. As the ever-expanding uses
of "corporate webs" in sophisticated business and financial contexts
show, there is ample room for creativity, and boundary-pushing, among
participants in business activities and the lawyers who facilitate their
activities. Among lawmakers and legal scholars, these boundarypushing efforts should be scrutinized energetically, both for what they
add to our understanding of effective commercial practices and for the
new or renewed regulatory limits they should evoke.

